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"The secret of education lies in respecting the pupil."
Ralph Waldo Emerson.
The New York City Board of Education,' along with a number
of other school boards,2 provides in its bylaws for the expulsion of
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., University of
Pennsylvania, 1959. LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1962. Member, Pennsylvania

Bar.
1 See Board of Education of New York City, By-laws § 90, Para. 3(c) (1964), as
supplemented through June 30, 1967. This bylaw provides that marriage constitutes a
"cause" for which a pupil may be "discharged" from the public schools. I have been
advised by the Law Society of the Board of Education that "the general practice has
been that where a pupil is found to be married, such pupil is discharged." Letter from
G. Gary Sousa, Law Society to Board of Education of City of N.Y., to the author,
Jan. 5, 1968, on file at Biddle Law Library.
2

See W. IviNs,

STUDENT MARRIAGES IN

NEW MEXIcO, SECONDARY

SCHOOLS,

1952-53, at 26-30, UNiv. OF NEw M-xico PuBRLIcATios IN EDUCATION, No. 5 (1954) ;
Atkyns, School Administrative Policy Related to Motherhood, Pregnancy, and Marriage, FAmILY COORDINATOR, April 1968, at 69; L. G. Carroll, The Status of Married
Students in the North Carolina Public High Schools 1960 (unpublished Ed. D. Thesis,
Duke University); Burchinal, Research on Young Marriage: Implications for Family
Life, in TRENDS IN FA MILY RESEARCH 508 (1960) ; Burchinal, School Policies and
School Age Marriages, in TRENDS IN FAMILY RESEARCH 43 (1960); Cavan &
Beling, A Study of High School Marriages, 20 MARRIAGE & FAMILY LrvING,
Aug. 1958, at 293; Ivins, Student Marriages in New Mexico Secondary Schools:
Practices and Policies, 22 MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LING, Feb. 1960, at 71; Landis &
Kidd, Attitudes and Policies Concerning Marriage Among High School Students,
18 MARRIAGE AND FAmLY LIVING, May 1956, at 128; Lissivoy & Hitchcock, High
School Marriagesin Pennsylvania, PA. SCHOOL BD. Ass'N BU.L., June 1963, at 31;
Sperry & Thompson, MarriageAmong High School Students, 45 BUL.. NAT'L Ass'N
OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL PRiNCIPALS, Nov. 1961, at 100.
The term "school board" is used throughout this article as a generic term for the
operating body of the local school district. The name applied to this body varies from
(373)
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married students from the public schools. Other boards do not attempt
to expel married students, but rather exclude them from participation
in extracurricular activities.3 Pregnant students ' and mothers ' (wed
state to state, and may even vary within a state. For example, the general term for
the school board in Pennsylvania is the "board of school directors," but in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh they are termed "board of public education." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 3-301 to 3-302 (Supp. 1967). Other terms used for school boards include
"district board of school trustees" (Maryland) and "school committee" (Massachusetts
and Rhode Island).
3
See studies cited note 2 supra.
4 Studies of school board policy in regard to pregnant students indicate that the
vast majority of school boards exclude pregnant students from attendance at regular
schools. A significant number exclude them at the time pregnancy is discovered,
while others defer this to a later stage. See Atkyns, supra note 2, at 69-73; Carroll,
.spra note 2, at 93-99; Burchinal, Research on Young Marriage: Implications for
Family Life, supra note 2, at 517; Burchinal, School Policies and School Age
Marriage,supra note 2, at 44-45; Ivins, Student Marriagesin New Mexico Secondary
Schools: Practicesand Policies, supra note 2, at 73; Landis & Kidd, supra note 2, at
133-134; Lissovoy & Hitchcock, supra note 2, at 32; Thompson, supra note 2, at 103;
TImE, Feb. 10, 1967, at 63-64. See also Los ANGELES CITY SCHOOL DisT. Div. oF
SECONDARY ED., BULL. No. 45, Aug. 28, 1967; Letter from Edward D. Brady,
Director, Socially Maladjusted Children, Chicago Board of Education, to Mr. James
W. Coffey, Jan. 3, 1968, on file at Biddle Law Library; SCHOOL DIST. OF PHILADELPHLA, DEP'T OF SUPERINTENDENCE, Div. OF PUPIL PERSONNEL AND COUNSELLING,
BULL. No. 51, June 13, 1947, as supplemented March 29, 1948, and File No. 440, Oct.
29, 1968. But see Resolution No. 1967-43 of the Maryland State Board of Education,
regarding By-law 720:3, adopted July 26, 1967. The only study of school board policy
in regard to unwed pregnant students that I have found is Atkyns, supra note 2, which
concludes that unmarried pregnant students are more often excluded from school than
are their married sisters. Id. at 71. This more restrictive attitude toward unwed
mothers-to-be is consistent with Burchinal's findings that girls pregnant before marriage are excluded at an earlier stage of pregnancy than girls whose marriage precedes their pregnancy. See Burchinal, School Policies and School Age Marriage,
supra note 2, at 44; Burchinal, Research on Young Marriage: Implications for Family
Life, supra note 2, at 517. The only specific school policy that I have found which
articulates this more restrictive attitude is that of Los Angeles. See Los ANGELES
CITY SCHOOL DIST., DIVISION OF SECONDARY EDUC. BULL., supra. In addition, L. G.
Carroll reports that the detailed policy, adopted by the Winston-Salem, N.C., school
board, concerning married and pregnant students,
is not concerned with pregnancies out of wedlock. According to the Superintendent, these cases will be handled under state laws which give school
officials the authority to dismiss students because of immoral action.
Carroll, supra note 2, at 127. See also 3A N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 11547 (1966).
Note, however, that Maryland's rule is that "a girl who is pregnant, either married
or unmarried, who has not completed her high school education may elect to remain
in the regular school program and shall not be involuntarily excluded from any part of
this program." Resolution No. 1967-43 of the Maryland State Board of Education,
supra (emphasis in the original).
5 School board policies toward mothers, wed or unwed, have not been the subject
of extensive sociological study. Burchinal's study of Iowa school board policies toward
married mothers indicated twice as many school boards (34%) excluded mothers who
became pregnant before marriage as excluded those who married before pregnancy.
Burchinal, School Policies and School Age Marriage,supra note 2, at 44-45. See also
L. G. Carroll, supra note 2, at 97, 121, 125-127.
The only study I have found that purports to examine school board treatment of
unwed mothers is Atkyns, supra note 2. However, this very short and sketchy study
does not differentiate their treatment from the treatment of married mothers or the
treatment of married students without children. The policy of the Philadelphia School
Board is that girls who have been excluded for pregnancy are eligible for readmission
upon presentation of a medical certificate from their physician or clinic "indicating
that they are physically able to return to school." ScHooL DIST. OF PHILADELPHIA,
DEP'T OF SUPERINTENDENCE, File No. 440, Oct 29, 1968. See also BULL. No. 51,
supra, note 4.
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and unwed), fraternity members, and boys with long hair 7 are subject
to similar sanctions.
The school boards generally cannot point to any specific statutory
provision to sustain these actions.' Rather, authority is sought in the
broad school board enabling act, which typically provides:
The board shall make rules for its own government and
that of the directors, officers, teachers, and pupils, and for
the care of the schoolhouse, grounds, and property of the
school corporation, and aid in the enforcement of the same,
and require the performance of duties by said persons imposed
by law and the rules.
It does not seem dear that exclusion or expulsion for the reasons
mentioned above is within this general grant of power to school
boards. Surprisingly, this appears not to have been of major concern
to school boards that have promulgated such rules or to courts that
have reviewed them. Neither the school boards nor the courts have
attempted to develop any consistent theory of school board rule-making
power over pupil conduct or status.
Decision-making by bodies charged with the administration of
public education is one of the most significant areas of law in terms
of its effect on the lives of individuals and groups in our society. Yet
0 it was an area of law virtually
prior to Brown v. Board of Education,"
6

See Wilson v. Board of Educ., 233 Il. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908); Wright v.
Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922) ; Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223
N.C. 763, 28 S.E2d 527 (1944); Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist, 190
S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441, 86 P. 642
(1906) ; A. FLOwERs & E. BOLmEIt, LAv AND PUPIL CONTROL 1143 (1964) ; note 8
infra.
7See Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967);
Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); Haircuts, the
Schools and the Law, EDuc. AGE, Sept-Oct., 1966, at 32; Howard, Student Dress,
School Policies and the Law, EDuc. DIG., May 1967, at 35; Comment, Personal Appearance of Students-The Abuse of a Protected Freedom, 20 ALA. L. REv. 104 (1967).
s Of this group, only rules prohibiting membership in fraternities are ordinarily
sanctioned by specific legislation. A number of states have passed statutes which
specifically prohibit high school fraternities. Some of these statutes expressly command the school to expel fraternity members. See Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237
U.S. 589 (1915) ; Sutton v. Board of Educ., 306 Ill. 507, 138 N.E. 131 (1923) ; Lee v.
Hoffman, 182 Iowa 1216, 166 N.W. 565 (1918); Burkett v. School Dist., 195 Ore.
471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952). Other statutes prohibit fraternities and specifically empower,
but do not command, school boards to expel fraternity members. See Hughes v.
Caddo Parish School Bd., 57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), aff'd, 323 U.S. 685
(1945); Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist, 245 Cal. App. 2d 278,
53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist Ct. App. 1966); Steele v. Sexton, 253 Mich. 32, 234 N.W.
436 (1931) ; cf. Satan Fraternity v. Board of Public Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 22 So.
2d 892 (1945) ; Holroyd v. Eibling, 116 Ohio App. 440, 188 N.E.2d 797 (1962).
The cases cited in note 6 supra involve school board rules against high school
fraternities that are not based on explicit statutory authority. It is this last group
with which this article is concerned.
9 IowA CODE § 279.8 (1966).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ignored by the legal profession.1 ' Since that time, courts, lawyers, and
legal writers have wrestled extensively with problems of racial segregation 12 and religious observances in the public schools,"3 and, to a
lesser extent, procedural regulations in school discipline. 4
Even this contemporary concern, however, has been limited almost
exclusively to issues of the constitutionality of educational policy. This
emphasis on constitutional issues-an emphasis not unique to education law-has resulted in an almost complete neglect of important
statutory and common-law issues concerning the scope and function
" A review of the standard casebooks and texts on administrative law and local
government reveals little or no coverage of educational decision-making. As far as I
know, there are no "education law" casebooks or textbooks designed for law school
use. I understand that Professors Bickel and Simons, however, teach a course in
education law at the Yale Law School for which they have prepared material. I am
currently giving an education law seminar at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School and have prepared materials on education law for the University of Pennsylvania Law School Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellowship Program.
There are a number of books that are used in schools of education for law courses.
See, e.g., R. DRURY & K. RAY, PRINCIPLES OF SCHOOL LAW (1965); N. EDWARDS,
THE COURTS AND THE PuBLIC SCHOOLS (rev. ed. 1955) ; A. FLOWERS & E. BoLmEIER,
LAW AND PUPIL CONTROL (1964); E. FULBRIGHT & E. BOLMEIER, COURTS AND THE
CURRICULUM (1964); R. HAMILTON & P. MORT, THE LAW AND PUBUC EDUCATION
(2d ed. 1959); A. REzNY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SCHOOL BOARDS (1966).
(It should
be pointed out that, with the exception of Dean Hamilton, all of these authors are
principally involved in education, not law.)

Writing in 1964, Lavern L. Cunningham, a professor of education, remarked: "We
educationalists find it most amusing to observe the contemporary discovery of local
school systems by political and social scientists.

It is as if thirty-five thousand local

units of government have popped up unexpectedly." Cunningham, Community Power:
Implications for Education, in THE POLITIcS OF EDUCATION IN THE LOCAL COMmuxrrY 27, 33 (R. Cahill & S. Hencley eds. 1964).

Professor Cunningham, I think,

would be equally amused to observe the contemporary discovery, or lack of discovery,
of local school systems by lawyers, courts, and legal thinkers.
12
See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) ; United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 380 F.2d
385, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840, 965 (1967) ; Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (1963) ;
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967) ; Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARv. L. Rxv. 564 (1965); Horowitz, Unseparate Int Unequal-The Emerging
Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1147
(1966) ; Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 157 (1963) ; Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes in the Public Schools of the North and West: The
Emerging Role for Private Constitutional Litigation, 35 Go. WASH. L. REv. 698
(1967).
' 3 See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; J. LoDER, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1965) ;
Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 SuP. CT.
REv. 1; Bruton, Education, Religion and the Bill of Rights Today, in CURRENT LEGAL
CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION 63 (L. Graber ed. 1966) ; Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. R-v. 25 (1962).
4
1 See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) ; Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp.
174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) ; Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process", 70 HARv. L.
REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 L. IN TRANsrrIoN Q. 1 (1965) ; Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 -.
ARv. L. REv.
1045, 1128-57 (1968) ; Note, Private Government on the Campus- JudicialReview of
University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
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of school board decision-making in the total societal scheme. 5 Indeed,
more than neglect has been the result. A preoccupation with constitutional issues has distorted both the constitutional and nonconstitutional questions involved. For example, the issue of the
power of a school board to prohibit extreme hair and dress styles often
has been joined as freedom of expression versus state power, 16 distorting both the first amendment and the legislative delegation of power
to school boards. This article is an attempt to ameliorate this situation
by exploring the nonconstitutional limits of the power of school boards
to make rules governing pupil conduct and status. 7

I.

TRADITioNAL VIEWS OF SCHOOL BOARD POWER

A. Geographic and Temporal--"In Loco Parentis"
Recent decisions reviewing the validity of school board rules
concerning student conduct or status have not contained any serious
analysis of the derivation and scope of school board regulatory power.
Authority for school board action, if questioned at all, is commonly
found in the general enabling act.'8 Yet this has not always been true,
and in the past courts have struggled to demarcate the limits of this
power. One line of cases, following Blackstone's concept that the
instructor acts in loco parentis, has viewed school board power as
deriving from parental authority. Under this view, the school has
plenary parental power over pupils while they are in school; 19 con15 See Van Alstyne, stpra note 14; Comment, 17 J. PuB. L. 151 (1968).
16 See, e.g., Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(teacher's right to wear beard) ; Brickman, Civil Liberties and Uncivility in School,
95 SCHOOL & SocIETy, Feb. 18, 1967, at 102; Comment, The Personal Appearance of
Students, supra note 7; Comment, 17 J. PuB. L. 151 (1968); Is Long Hair a Civil
Right? N.Y. Times, Oct 16, 1966, § 4 at 11, col. 3. Compare the current litigation in
Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist, Civil No. WC6736 (N.D. Miss.
1967), involving the exclusion of an unwed mother from school. As of this writing a
preliminary injunction was denied by Judge Clayton in a memorandum opinion
(December 27, 1967) that discussed only constitutional issues. The papers in the case
also indicate that the plaintiff relies almost exclusively on constitutional issues. This
litigation also illustrates another aspect of the current fixation with constitutional
issues-the tendency to resort to federal courts whenever possible. See also Ferrell
v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 98
(1968).
17 This does not mean that the type of considerations relevant to a determination
that a certain activity is constitutionally protected so as to be beyond the power of the
government to regulate are not relevant to a determination that, under a given statutory
scheme, an activity is to be regulated (if at all) only by the general legislature and
not by educational administrative organs. Evidence of this will be seen throughout
this article.
I8 See, e.g., Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1262, 147 N.W.2d 854,
857 (1967) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 34,
302 S.W.2d 57, 59 (1957).
19 See Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933) ; McLean Independent School Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Flory v.
Smith, 145 Va. 164, 134 S.E. 360 (1926).
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versely, the school has no power over them once they return to the
home, the domain of the real parent.2
A clear statement of the rule that school boards have plenary
parental power over pupils while they are actually attending school
appears in the 1933 Nebraska case of Richardson v. Brahan.2 1 A
school board regulation prohibited high school students from leaving
the school grounds during the school day of 9:00 A.M. to 3:05 P.M.
"except such students as live quite close to the high school building,
and whose parents request in writing that they be permitted to go
home." ' The regulation was challenged by a group of parents in an
action brought to enjoin its enforcement. Prior to the adoption of the
regulation a number of students had patronized a private cafeteria
adjacent to the school grounds. The school district itself operated a
cafeteria in the school building. In upholding the rule the court stated:
During school hours . . . general education and the

control of pupils who attend public schools are in the hands of
school boards, superintendents, principals and teachers. This
control extends to health, proper surroundings, necessary
discipline, promotion of morality and other wholesome influences, while parental authority is temporarily superseded.'
The Florida Supreme Court has written in a similar vein in
upholding the expulsion of a college student:
As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and
welfare of the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis
and in their discretion may make any regulation for their
government which a parent could make for the same purpose
24

The fact that a particular school board rule governs conduct that
takes place at school rather than away from school may well be significant in determining its validity.24 Yet, the view that the school
20 See Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515 (1909) ; State ex rel. Clark v.
Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887) ; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877). An inschool/out-of-school dichotomy would leave in doubt the question of control over
pupil behavior en route to and from school. Some states have passed statutes specifically giving the school authorities the same power over the pupils on the way to and
from school as they have over pupils in school. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 18A :25-2
(1968) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1317 (1967) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 22-72(2) (1964).
In other jurisdictions, courts have had to solve the problem without legislative guidance. See O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 28 A. 25 (1925) ; Jones v. Cody, 132
Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495 (1902); Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485 (1885); cf. Cleary v.

Booth [1893] 1 Q.B. 465.
21 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933) ; see cases cited supra note 19.

125 Neb. at 143, 249 N.W. at 558.
at 145-46, 249 N.W. at 559.
24
John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924).
25 See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
22

2Id.

SCHOOL BOARD-AUTHORITY

board has plenary power over pupils in school is an oversimplification
and distortion of the in loco parentis doctrine.
The classic statement of the doctrine comes from Blackstone:
[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of -his
child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion
of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that
of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer
the purposes for which he is employed.
Three things should be noted about this statement. First, Blackstone's language of "restraint and correction" is consistent with the
fact that the in loco parentis doctrine has traditionally been cited as a
justification for the use of reasonable force to punish what might be
called "unquestionably wrong" pupil conduct, rather than as a justification for the regulation, through school rules, of conduct about which
reasonable men might differ. In other words, the doctrine traditionally has been used to justify the corporal form of punishment rather
than the underlying basis for the punishment.17 Second, Blackstone
stated that a parent "may" delegate his authority to a schoolmaster,
thus resting the doctrine on a voluntary delegation by the parent rather
than a legal displacement of parental authority."
These two points, however, do not seem significant in an age of
compulsory and public education. Whether the power is properly
termed in loco parentis authority or something else, it is clear that
school authorities are not restricted to punishing pupils only for those
activities that all men would condemn. There is no doubt that state
educational codes delegate to school boards the power to make some
debatable rules of student conduct. In making these rules school
authorities are not restricted to fulfilling parental desires: the duty
of public school authorities to educate and protect the children placed
in their charge gives them the authority to adopt rules of conduct
necessary to carry out that duty even though a parent may object to
the application of a particular rule to his child.'
26 1 W. BLAcKsTONF, CommENTARImS *453. See Note, Private Government on the
Caminus--idicialReview of University Expdsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1367-72 (1963).
27 See Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 241, 24 A.2d 468, 469 (1942) ; Note,
supra note 26, at 1367-68, and cases cited therein; Comment, 55 CALr}. L. REv. 911,
916 and cases cited therein; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 147-55 (1965).
28 Cf. Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941) ; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 153(1) (1965).
29
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 153 (1965) states:
Power of Parent to Restrict Privilege.
(1) One who is in charge of the control, training, or education of a child
solely as the delegate of its parent is not privileged to inflict a punishment
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However, it is significant that Blackstone's statement does not
support a doctrine that school authorities completely displace parental
authority during the school day. The Blackstonian in loco parentis
theory gives the school authorities only that "portion of the power of
a parent . . . as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which
he is employed."
A 1916 Texas case recognizes this principle in the following
terms:
Generally speaking, it must be said that the superintendent, principal, and board of trustees of a public free
school, to a limited extent at least, stand, as to pupils attending the school, in loco parentis, and they may exercise such
powers of control, restraint, and correction over such pupils
as may be reasonably necessary to enable the teachers to
perform their duties and to effect the general purposes of
education."
Other courts have also recognized that the in loco parentis doctrine, properly understood, does not mean that school authorities displace parents as to all schoolhouse activities.31 An interesting example
which the parent has forbidden or to punish the child for doing or refusing to
do that which the parent has directed the child to do or not to do.
(2) One who is in charge of the education or training of a child as a public
officer is privileged to inflict such reasonable punishments as are necessary for

the child's proper education or training, notwithstanding the parent's prohibitions or wishes.
It should be noted that this section is concerned only with discipline for the good
of the offending child. Section 154 makes it clear that, even in a private school, authorities can discipline a child contrary to his parent's wishes where it is necessary "for the
education and training of the children as a group." However, as to the training and
education of the individual child, the Restatement retains the voluntary nature of the
Blackstonian rule as to private schools, but rejects it as to public schools. Moreover,
this rejection is not limited to compulsory school law attendance, concerning which it
could be said that, as far as is necessary to educate the child, the legislature has decided
that school authorities do displace parental authority. Rather the Restatement rejects
the delegation theory as to both compulsory and voluntary public school attendance.
See Comment d. Although the rationale for this is not stated clearly in the Comment,
it appears to be based on the principle that a parent cannot avail himself of the facilities of a public school and then deny that institution the power to perform the function
for which it was created. Cf. Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 11 Ga.
801, 36 S.E. 920 (1900) ; Stuckey v. Churchman, 2 I1. App. 584 (1878) ; Kidder v.
Chellis, 59 N.H. 473 (1879); Commonwealth ex rel. School Dist. v. Bey, 166 Pa.
Super. 136, 70 A.2d 693 (1950). Buit cf. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54
Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921) ; Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel.
Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (1877) ; Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567 (1875) ; State ex rel. Kelly
v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914) ; State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist.,
31 Neb. 552, 48-N.W. 393 (1891).
30
Hailey v. Brooks, 191 S.W. 781, 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
31
See Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921);
Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (1877) ; Rulison v. Post,
79 Ill. 567 (1875) ; State ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914);
State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 373 (1891);
Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 23 A.2d 468 (1942) ; State ex rel. Bowe v.
Board of Educ., 63 Wis. 234, 23 N.W. 102 (1885).
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is the 1942 Pennsylvania case of Guerrieri v. Tyson,3 2 concerning a
statute that expressly provided:
Every teacher in the public schools shall have the right
to exercise the same authority as to conduct and behavior over
the pupils attending his school, during the time they are in
attendance, including the time going to and from their homes,
as the parents, guardians or persons in parental relation to
such pupils may exercise over them.In Guerrieri,a student developed an infected finger while in school.
His teacher sought to treat it and in so doing aggravated the infection,
permanently disfiguring the student's hand. Despite the broad language
of the statute, the court rejected it as a defense to the resultant assault
and battery action on the grounds that the statute should be construed
as limiting the grant of parental authority to school administrators to
those powers necessary to the effectuation of the school's purposes.
The court stated:
Under the delegated parental authority implied from the
relationship of teacher and pupil, a teacher may inflict reasonable corporal punishment on a pupil to enforce discipline . . .
but there is no implied delegation of authority to exercise her
lay judgment, as a parent may, in the matter of the treatment
of injury or disease suffered by a pupil. .

.

. Whether treat-

ment of the infected finger was necessary was a question for
the boy's parents to decide. The status of a parent, with
some of the parent's privileges, is given a school teacher by
law in aid of the education and learning of the child [citing
the Pennsylvania statute] and ordinarily does not extend
beyond matters of conduct and discipline. There is nothing
in the teacher-pupil relationship between the defendants in
this case and the minor plaintiff which can relieve them from
responsibility for their acts.34
The Restatement of Torts, Second, codifies this rule in the follow-

ing language:
One who is charged only with the education or some
other part of the training of a child has the privilege of using
force or confinement to discipline the child only in so far as
the privilege is necessary for the education or other part of
the training which is committed or delegated to the actor.3 5
One who is in charge of the training or education of a
group of children is privileged to apply such force or impose
32 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).
33
PA. STAT. ANx. tit 24, § 13-1317 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1967).
34 147 Pa. Super. at 241, 24 A.2d at 469.
3

5 RESTATEMEN r (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 152 (1965).
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such confinement upon one or more of them as is reasonably
necessary to secure observance of the discipline necessary forthe education and training of the children as a group.36
These two sections read together embody the rule that the in loco
parentis authority of a school over a student is limited to the purpose
of the school's existence: the student's education or the education of
the group of which the student is a memberY.
The converse of the oversimplified in loco parentis doctrine of
plenary school board power while the student is in school is that school
boards have no power over a pupil once he returns home. The case
most often cited for this rule is Dritt v. Snodgrass,38 an 1877 Missouri
decision. A school board rule prohibiting pupils from attending social
parties during the school year was challenged when the parents of a
high school pupil expelled for violation of the rule brought suit for
damages against the school board. The Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed a demurrer to the declaration on the grounds that a suit for
damages was not the proper remedy.3 9 A majority of the court,
however, went on to state:
When the schoolroom is entered by the pupil, the authority of the parent ceases, and that of the teacher begins;
when sent to his home, the authority of the teacher ends, and
that of the parent is resumed. For his conduct when at
school, he may be punished or even expelled, under proper
circumstances; for his conduct when at home, he is subject to
domestic control. The directors, in prescribing the rule that
scholars who attend a social party should be expelled from
school, went beyond their power, and invaded the right of the
parent to govern the conduct of his child, when solely under
his charge.'
As with the in loco parentis doctrine itself, the rule stating that the
school board has no power over a pupil's conduct at home embodies
36

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 154 (1965).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 153, Comment d (1965) providing

3T

that:

no order of the school board or other body in charge of the public schools can
confer upon the school authorities any privilege in excess of those stated in
this Topic.
38 66 Mo. 286 (1877).
39 In refusing to hold the school board members personally liable in damages for
illegally expelling a student the court stated:
School directors are elected by the people, receive no compensation for their
services, are not always or frequently men who are thoroughly informed as to
the best modes of conducting schools.
Id. at 293. Four of the 5 judges indicated in a concurring opinion that plaintiff could
have recovered had malice been alleged and proven.
4

0 Id.at 298.
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some valid principles, but is nevertheless an oversimplification of the
issue. Just as the courts have recognized that not all schoolhouse
conduct is subject to school control, so they have recognized that not
all outside conduct is free from school control."
An early case upholding school sanctions applied to out-of-school
conduct is the 1859 Vermont case of Lander v. Seaver.' Young
master Lander, while in the company of some other pupils, was driving
his parents' cows past his teacher's house an hour and a half after
school had ended and was heard (presumably by his teacher) referring
to his teacher as "Old Jack Seaver." The following day Old Jack
whipped him for the reference, and Lander brought an assault and
battery action. A judgment for the teacher was reversed on the
grounds that the jury charge on excessive force was erroneous. In
the course of its opinion, however, the court upheld a jury charge that
corporal punishment was permissible under the circumstances. After
noting the general rule that school authorities lack power to act in
regard to out-of-school activities, the court stated that there was an
exception to this rule for outside activity that "has a direct and immediate tendency to injure the school, to subvert the master's authority,
43
and to beget disorder and insubordination."
41
Courts have upheld school sanctions against students for engaging in such outside school activities as (1) writing and publishing a poem satirizing school rules,
State ex iel. Dresser v. District Bd., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232 (1908) ; cf. Wooster
v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (Dist Ct. App. 1915). But cf. Murphy v.
Board of Directors, 30 Iowa 429 (1870). See generally Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904). (2) Joining a high school fraternity, Wilson
v. Board of Educ., 233 Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908) ; Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223
N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527 (1944) ; Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441, 86 P. 642 (1906) ;
cf. Webb v. State Univ., 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Isrig v. Srygley, 210
Ark. 580, 197 S.W.2d 39 (1946); Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103, 191 N.E. 407
(1934). But see Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922). But cf.
Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 (1882) ; Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist.,
190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). (3) Becoming intoxicated in town on
Christmas day, Douglass v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211 (1909). (4) Getting
married, Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) ; State
ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962) ; State ex iel.
Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957);
Kissick v. Garland Independent School Dist. 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ;
Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 22, 381 P.2d 718 (1963) ; ef. Cochrane v.
Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960). But see Nutt v. Board of
Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929); Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W2d 677
(Ky. Ct. App. 1964); McLeon v. State ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737
(1929); Anderson v. Canyon Independent School Dist, 412 S.W2d 387 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967). (5) Becoming pregnant, State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op.
2d 262, 175 N.E.2d 539 (1961). (6) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct, Sherman v.
Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160 (1851); cf. Perry v. Grenada
Mun. Separate School Dist, Civ. No. WC6736 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 27, 1967). But
cf. Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929).
4232 Vt. 114 (1859).
43
Id. at 120. Earlier in its opinion the court stated the general rule that school
authority ends when the pupil arrives home. The court, however, went on to say that
the exception of outside action that has a direct tendency to injure the school was a
rule "[b]ly common consent and by the universal custom in our New England schools
.
" Id. at 121. No authority was cited for this statement The only case I have
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Thus, school board power cannot be demarcated absolutely on any
in-school/out-of-school dichotomy. Under the Blackstonian in loco
parentis doctrine, properly understood, school board authority must be
demarcated on more subtle distinctions derived from the functions that
society has given the school board to perform.
B. School Boards: Local Government or State Administrative
Agencies?
The Blackstonian common-law conception of school authority was
based on the view that parental authority was given up to the school.
This doctrine predated extensive state involvement in public education.
Today's school board is not a private agency designed to fulfill parental
desires, but rather a public agency operating under a legislative dele44
gation of authority.
Many attempts have been made to classify local school boards
either as legislative organs of local government or as administrative
agencies of state government. The proponents of the local government
theory emphasize that the vast majority of school boards in this
country are popularly elected, that membership comes from the local
citizenry, and that we have a strong historical tradition of local
autonomy in public education. 45 Those who prefer to consider the
found decided before Lander that supports this exception is Sherman v. Inhabitants of
Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160 (1851), discussed in text accompanying notes
102-04 infra. This does not, of course, mean that there was no such customary school
board practice or general community understanding. Compare text accompanying
note 143 infra.
44 One preliminary question is whether this legislative delegation preempts the
common-law in loco parentis authority. No court or legal writer has ever adequately
explored this issue, and cases in which the courts state that school boards have only
the powers statutorily granted to them, see, e.g., Cray v. Howard-Winneshick Community School Dist., 260 Iowa - -, 150 N.W2d 84 (1967) ; Independent School Dist.
v. Mattheis, 275 Minn. 383, 147 N.W.2d 374 (1966), exist alongside cases which recognize an in loco parentis basis for school board authority, see notes 19-37 supra and
accompanying text.
The two lines of development may be reconciled on the ground that while the
statutory delegation of school board authority is exclusive, the statutory scheme must
nevertheless be read against the background of the common-law rules. However, for
purposes of this article, it is not necessary to answer this question definitely. Both
doctrines reach the same result as to the criteria for determining the validity of school
board regulatory power.
45
See R. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R. McPHEE, THE ORGANIZATION AND
CONTROL OF AMERICAN SCHooLS 80-109, 157-85 (1965); Cunningham, supra note
11; Eliot, Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics, 53 Am. PoL. Sci. Rv.
1032 (1959). A 1962 study by the United States Office of Education found that, in
districts enrolling 1200 or more pupils, nearly 86% of the school board members
were elected. A. WHITE, LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS: ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICES 8
(1962). A somewhat lesser percentage (73%) were elected in the larger school
districts, i.e., those enrolling more than 25,000 pupils. Id. A survey of the current
state statutes indicates that in 31 states all local school boards are elected, in 4 states
and the District of Columbia all school boards are appointed, and in 14 states there is
a mixed system with some local boards elected and some appointed. In the mixed
states the usual pattern is for the larger city boards to be appointed and the others
elected. One state, Hawaii, does not have local school boards. Id.
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school board as the agency of state government charged with administering public education in a given geographic section emphasize the
state's plenary legal power over the organization, powers, and functions
of the local boards. 46
As with other questions of characterization it is essential to bear
in mind the purpose for which the characterization is made. The
writers and courts attempting the classification may be dealing with
such distinct and disparate issues as the application of a mechanic's
46

See R. DRURY & K RAY, supra note 11, at 7, 103-06; R. HAMILTON & P. MORT,
supra note 11, at 116; Edwards, The Place of the Pliblic School in Our Governmental
Structure, in CURRENT LEGAL Co cpTs N EDUCATION 29 (L. Garber ed. 1966).
Although the statutory schemes vary somewhat, the basic outline of the structures
of public education in the states is quite uniform. Each state constitution contains a
provision for public education, generally one commanding the state legislature to establish and maintain a public system of education. R. DRURY & K RAY, upra note 11,
at 7. See the Iowa statute quoted in the text at p. 375 supra. This broad delegation
of rulemaking power to local school boards is responsible for the fact that the overwhelming majority of decisions in the subject area of this study-the school-pupil
relationship--are made by such local school boards. This extensive allocation of power
to local school boards is consistent with the historical pattern of public education in
this country. For a good discussion of this history see R. CAMPBELL et al., supra
note 45. This pattern does not, of course, mean that public education is exclusively
the province of the local boards. As discussed below in the text, local autonomy has
always existed at the will of and within the limits set by the state. In our century the
federal government has exercised an increasing degree of involvement with public
education. See id. at 20-46. Education, then, like many other public activities in our
society, is 'subject to the power and influence of local bodies and the state and federal
governments. Also, within the state system there are a number of agencies other than
local school boards involved in public education decision making. There are often
statutory provisions on such things as school boundaries and financing. Reference has
already been made to statutes concerning high school fraternities, see note 8 supra.
Each state in this country also has a central state administrative authority with
jurisdiction over education. Indeed, in most states there are two such agencies, a
state board of education (existing in 48 of the 50 states) and a chief state school officer,
usually denominated the state superintendent of education (existing in all 50 states).
In the 24 states where the state superintendent of education is appointed by the state
board of education, he is an employee of the state board, as with a local district
superintendent of schools, and authority resides in the state board. However, in the
other states the state superintendent is either elected (21 states) or appointed by the
governor (5 states), and has authority independent of the state board of education.
The line of demarcation between these two authorities is usually unclear. See
R. CAmPBELL et al., supra note 45, at 50-79. With the notable exception of recent decisions in hair and dress cases by the New Jersey State Board of Education (Pelletreau
v. Board of Educ., Sept. 6, 1967), and the New York Commissioner of Education
(In re Dalrymple, March 14, 1966), and a rule concerning pregnant girls adopted by
the Maryland State Board of Education (Resolution No. 1967-43, re Bylaw 720:3,
July 26, 1967), all of which will be discussed below, these central agencies have not
been a significant factor in decision making in the area of school-pupil relations.
See generally, on the powers and duties of central agencies, R. CAMPBELL et al., supra
note 45, at 47-79; R. HAMILTON & P. MORT, supra note 11, at 19-21, 83-115.
Twenty-seven states also have an intermediate unit of public education administration, i.e., a unit between the local school board and the state agencies. See generally
R. CAMPBELL et al., supra note 45, at 110-39. Again, however, this unit has not had
significant influence on the subject area of this article.
Finally, among formal decision-makers in public education, are the professional
educational staff from the superintendent down through the classroom teachers. This
group does have a significant effect on decisions in the area of school-pupil relations.
The basic policy decisions in this area, however, are made by the school boards
either by rule or by adjudicating the results of staff action against a pupil. Therefore,
staff action generally either implements prior board policy, or has been ratified by
board adjudication. Thus, we return to the fact that the primary policy maker in
the area of school-pupil relations is the local school board.
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lien law to a school board,4" the application of local zoning ordinances
to school buildings,4" the validity of the delegation of taxing power to
school boards,4' the allocation of power to reorganize school districts,",
the application of the "one-man, one-vote" principle to school board
elections,, 1 or the obligation of the school board to be responsive to the
electorate., 2 Obviously the formulation of a single, all-embracing characterization of the school board, either as a legislative local government
agency or as an administrative branch of the state government structure
would becloud sound analysis and create more problems than would
be solved. The classification, if made at all, must be based on the
purposes for which it is made. 3
However, a choice need not be made between these two competing
characterizations in order to determine the proper demarcation of the
scope of school board substantive power over pupil conduct and status. 4
Whether the school board is viewed as an agency of state government
or as a local government unit, its function is the same-operating the
public school system within a delimited geographic area. The overwhelming weight of authority in this country is to the effect that,
subject to the powers granted to the federal government, sovereign
governmental power resides in the state, not in any of its political
subdivisions." A local government unit with general functions, for
example, a municipal government, is one to which the legislature has
4T
Commissioner of Pub. Instruction v. Fell, 52 N.J. Eq. 689, 29 A. 816 (1894).
See also Florman v. School Dist., 6 Colo. App. 319, 40 P. 469 (1895).
4
sCity of Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School Dist., 254 Iowa 900,
119 N.W.2d 909 (1963); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, 42 N.J.
556, 202 A.2d 161 (1964). For a discussion of cases on this issue as well as other
issues involving the classification of school boards, see Fox, The Authority of the
unicipality to Control and Support Public School, in CURRET LEGAL CONCEPTS IN
EDucATION 163 (L. Garber ed. 1966).
49
Moore v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 338 Pa. 466, 13 A.2d 29 (1940) ; Wilson v.
School Dist., 328 Pa. 22, 195 A. 90 (1937).
50
Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905); School Dist v. Zediker, 4 Okla. 599,
47 P. 482 (1896). See also Buttolph v. Osborn, 119 Vt. 116, 119 A.2d 686 (1956);
R. HA M oN & P. MORT, mspra note 11, at 588-614.
51 Compare Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), and Comment, 21
VAND. L. REv. 153 (1967), with Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
52 See Buttolph v. Osborn, 119 Vt. 116, 119 A.2d 686 (1956) ; Eliot, Toward an
Understandingof Public School Politics, 53 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1032 (1959) ; Shannon,
School Board Communications, in LwAL PROBLMS OF SCHoOL BoAus 53, 77 (A.
Rezny ed. 1966); N. MASTERS, R. SALISBURY & T. ELIOT, STATE POLITICS AND THE
Ptmuc SCHOOLS 1-5 (1964).
Zi See Fox, supra note 48, for a good discussion of the authority of municipal
government over school boards which recognizes this principle and correctly states that
the touchstone for decision must be legislative intent See also Wilmore v. Annear,
100 Colo. 106, 65 P.2d 1433 (1937).
64The fact of popular election, however, does have significance in deciding some
of the issues involved in determining the basic criteria for the exercise of school board
power; see text accompanying notes 66-68, 177 infra.
55 J. FORDHAm, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw 40-50 (1949).
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delegated extensive legislative power over local matters.!" Clearly,
however, legislatures have not delegated such general legislative power
to school boards.5" Under a local government characterization, a
school board is a special local unit created to regulate matters of
concern to public education, not a general local government unit with
general legislative power over youths in its geographic territory05
Thus, whether viewed as an instrument of state educational policy or
as a special-function local government unit, a school board's charge
is limited to the regulation of public education.

II. A

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL BOARD POWER

Both the in loco parentis doctrine and the doctrine of legislative
delegation of authority lead to the same result: a school board has that
power, and only that power, over student conduct and status which
is properly related to its function of educating the pupils in its charge.
This function may be divided into two main categories:
1. Education per se, and
2. Serving as a host to the pupils.
Obviously, the primary function of the public school system is educating
its pupils." Yet in terms of the concerns of this article, the ancillary,
host function is more significant. Education takes place in buildings
that must be maintained in good repair. Children are educated in
groups and must be protected from harm from each other while they
are congregated together.
A necessary condition to the validity of a school board rule is
that it serve the education per se or host functions. However, the
determination that a rule meets this requirement does not end the
inquiry into its validity. Basic to our societal and governmental
structures is the assumption that certain areas of conduct, if subject to
any governmental regulation at all, should be regulated by the legislature. These are usually areas, such as teenage marriage, that require
a delicate balancing of complex societal values. This does not mean
that the legislature can never delegate to subordinate bodies the
authority to regulate these areas. It does mean, however, that broad,
vague statutory grants of power to such bodies should not readily be
56 Id. at 367-68.
5•7E.g., Iowa Code §279.8 (1966), quoted in text accompanying note 9 pra,
which speaks of "pupils," not "children."
Z8J. FoRDHIAM, supra note 55, at 25-31. See also Barth v. School Dist, 393 Pa.
557, 143 A.2d 909 (1958).
69 A part of the education per se function is that of creating and maintaining a
proper educational atmosphere. See note 93 infra.
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interpreted as including such a delegation of authority. The presumption of our societal and governmental systems often require that
these delegations be explicit. 0
Furthermore, broad statutory grants of rulemaking power to
school boards should not be read as legislative permission to promulgate
any and all rules related to the functioning of the educational structure
regardless of the effect that such rules might have on other societal
interests. School boards that make and enforce rules do not operate
in isolation, and, particularly at the fringe of school board authority,
school rules may collide with those of other decision makers, public
and private. When this occurs, a school board rule cannot be found
valid simply because it serves a valid school board function. The
contrary rule of the other decision maker may also serve a purpose
appropriate to its function. It therefore becomes necessary to determine
which has primacy in each particular case. In the absence of a specific
60

See Mathews v. Board of Educ., 127 Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (1901) (Moore,
J., dissenting) ; Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922) ; State
ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914) (Letton, J., concurring);
cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) :
So far as national law is concerned a drastic change in public policy in a
matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as
to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate
rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side
of the federal courts. I deem a requirement as to the invasion of a person to
stand on very different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of
documents, pre-trial procedure and other devices for the expeditious economic
and fair conduct of litigation ...
. . . And so I conclude that to make the drastic change that Rule 35
sought to introduce would require explicit legislation.
This argument is a variant of the classic delegation doctrine, which is premised on the
theory that, in our governmental structure, certain policy decisions must be made by
the sovereign representative legislature and that the legislature cannot avoid this responsibility by passing it on to administrators. For discussions of the classic delegation doctrine see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW §§ 2-01 to 2-16 (1958) ; L. JAFFE,
JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACrION 28-86 (1965). The doctrine may have
only minimal vitality today; see K. DAvIs, supra; L. JAFFE, supra. But see United

States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269 (1967) (Brennan, 3., concurring) ; Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965) (Black, 3., dissenting) ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). It has never been employed
to invalidate the delegation of a general rulemaking power to school boards. Yet the
underlying premise that our social and governmental structures assume that certain
areas of conduct, if regulated at all by government, should be regulated at the legislative level, still has validity. At the very least, therefore, the delegation doctrine should
remain vital as a principle of statutory construction. General grants of power to
school boards should not be construed to enable them to make decisions of the type
that are generally reserved for the legislature. An act should not be construed as
delegating such power to school boards unless the terms of the delegation are explicit.
See generally Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 27 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ; Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); A. BicKL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 156-169

(1962) ; Freedman, Uses and Limits of Remand in, Administrative Law: Staleness of
the Record, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 145, 153-57 (1966) ; cf. L. JAFFE, .Upra, at 72-73, 79.
This analysis of the delegation doctrine is based on some of the same premises and
seeks some of the same objectives as the Supreme Court's use of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine in state administrative cases; see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 67 (1966). Compare the use of both doctrines
by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 269 (1967). See also A. BICErI, supra, at 149-153.
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legislative directive as to primacy, the determination must be made
through an examination of the total statutory scheme (not just the
education code) and the background of societal traditions against
which the legislature has enacted this scheme.
A. Education Per Se
As indicated above, there are extremely few court decisions concerning the validity of coercive school rules that turn on whether or
not the rule is related to the child's education. The host function is
much more important for this purpose. Yet, a full discussion of school
board power must deal with its power to make coercive rules as a direct
part of its educational function.
The only case that I have found which squarely faces the issue
whether a given rule is part of a school's basic educational function is
State ex rel. Bowe v. Board of Education,6 decided in Wisconsin
in 1885. In that case a long-standing rule required
each pupil of sufficient age and bodily strength, upon returning
from the play-ground at recess, to bring with him a stick of
wood fitted for stove use, to supply the stoves with fuel in the
rooms occupied by such pupils, and to keep the rooms warm
and comfortable. 2
Relator's son was suspended for not bringing in his stick of wood.
In an action to compel his reinstatement, the court held the rule
invalid; indeed, the court was shocked that any teacher or school board
would think the rule valid. It had "nothing to do with the education
of the child. It is nothing but manual labor, pure and simple, and
has no relation to mental development." '
This court's limited view of the scope of the educational function
would be open to great attack today. We have accepted both bodily
and social development as legitimate aims of education. As Professor
Ernest Brown has written,
There are disputes about methods, and disputes about particular goals and purposes, but there is little dispute within
[a very] wide . . . spectrum of persons responsible for
education . . . about the comprehensive responsibility of the

educational process, or about the idea that education is more
than "instruction in the classroom." 64
0163 Wis. 234, 23 N.W. 102 (1885).
0 Id. at 235-36, 23 N.W. at 103.
6363

Wis. at 237, 23 N.W. at 103.
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sue.

04Brown,

CT. REV. 1, 11.
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Typically, courts have had to define the scope of school board
authority to act for education per se in cases involving expenditures
for equipment and facilities, such as athletic fields, or involving the
institution of optional curricular offerings. In these cases, the courts
have been virtually unanimous in upholding the school boards' actions.a5
The sole issue in these cases is a pocketbook one, and whether
this is viewed as involving an increase in total expenditure or an
allocation of limited resources among competing programs,66 the courts
are correct in viewing school board power broadly in this respect. 6T
The taxpayer's pocketbook concern finds protection in the representative, locally responsible nature of the school board. There is no
need for judicial intervention. Despite the increased flow of federal
and state aid to public education, the basic source of funds is still local
65 As to equipment and facilities, see, e.g., Alexander v. Phillips, 31 Ariz. 503, 254
P. 1056 (1927) ; In re Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 Fla. 490, 35 So. 2d 579 (1948) ;
Dodge v. Jefferson County Ed. of Educ., 298 Ky. 1, 181 S.W.2d 406 (1944); McNair
,%School Dist., 87 Mont. 423, 288 P. 188 (1930) ; Kay County Excise Bd. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 185 Okla. 327, 91 P.2d 1087 (1939) ; Galloway v. School Dist., 331
Pa. 48, 200 A. 99 (1938). But see Wilson v. Graves County Ed. of Educ., 307 Ky.
203, 210 S.W.2d 350 (1948). As to curricular offerings, see Security Natl Bank v.
Bagley, 202 Iowa 701, 210 N.W. 947 (1926); E. FuILmIGHT & E. BOLMESER, .mpra
note 11, at 10-78, and cases cited therein. The Kay County case involved a provision
of the Oklahoma Education Code that empowered school boards "to incur all expenses, within the limitations provided by law, necessary to carry out and fulfill all
powers herein granted." After discussing the various possible meanings of the word
"necessary" the court concluded:
The vesting of broad powers and discretion in the board of education of
independent school districts by the 1937 act, above quoted, points readily to
the thought that the Legislature did not intend to so restrict such board as to
limit expenses only for things indispensable to the maintenance and operation
of its public school system; and we conclude that such expenses as are convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the desired ends
of the general program, and to the conduct of such school system, are authorized to be incurred thereunder, in the discretion of the board, unless
otherwise restricted by law.
185 Okla. at 328-29, 91 P.2d at 1089.
166 This must be distinguished from the situation in which the school board seeks
to spend funds for purposes prohibited, not merely to themselves, but to all branches
of the government, e.g., expenditures for religious purposes. It should also be distinguished from the situation in which there is a dispute among government agencies
as to which agency is the appropriate one to promote the proposed program.
67
Indeed, the wide range of school board discretion as to expenditures has been
held to be applicable to spending, not only for curricular purposes, but also for noncurricular educational aids. For example, in Moseley v. Dallas, 17 S.W2d 36 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1929), the court upheld the decision of the Dallas School Board to maintain health clinics in those schools providing free examinations to students whose
parents had no objections. The clinics also administered emergency first aid but
treatment was limited to that service. In the taxpayer suit to enjoin the expenditure
of funds for the clinics, the court emphasized the voluntary nature of the examinations,
the limited nature of nonconsensual treatment, and the fact that the board of health
was in agreement with the school board policy. As a result, the sole issue for determination was whether the school board should spend taxpayers' money for these
purposes. The court had little trouble in holding the expenditure proper on the grounds
that knowledge of a pupil's physical condition aids the school authorities in educating
him. See also State ex rel. Stoltenberg v. Brown, 112 Minn. 370, 128 N.W. 294
(1910) ; Hallett v. Post Printing & Pub. Co., 68 Colo. 573, 192 P. 658 (1920). But
see McGilvra v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 113 Wash. 619, 194 P. 817 (1921).
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taxation, and the expenditure of these funds involves no interest other
than that common to all the school district's residents as taxpayers.6s
There are other considerations involved, however, in cases where
a school board adopts coercive rules of conduct in order to instill
societal values in its pupils. Certainly, instilling such values is an
accepted part of the educational function, and may include not only
the presentation of information, but also a certain degree of indoctrination."9 Yet, there is still a difference, for example, between conducting a course in "Marriage and Family Living," in which the
dangers of teenage marriage are discussed and even inveighed against,
and excluding married students from school or from extracurricular
activities as a means of inducing the other pupils to believe that
teenage marriage is undesirable. The former is the traditional mode
of education through instruction, or indoctrination by persuasion; the
latter is an attempt to instruct or indoctrinate students by imposing
sanctions on pupils who violate those rules embodying the values
sought to be imparted-values, often, in an area of delicately balanced
legislative judgments.7
Moreover, the parents who disagree with the
68 In general, the cases that support school board expenditures and curricular
offerings do not explicitly rely on the fact that the school board is an elected body.
However, there are a few exceptions. See Kay County Excise Bd. v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 185 Okla. 327, 91 P.2d 1087 (1939) (state education law evinces an "evident
purpose of strong recognition of local self-government and responsibility") ; Security
Nat'l Bank v. Bagley, 202 Iowa 701, 210 N.W. 947 (1926) (addition to curriculum of
bank saving plan upheld; court noted that it was especially to interfere with such
school board decision since "matters of school administration are kept very closely in
the hands of the people themselves"); cf. Moseley v. Dallas, 17 S.W.2d 36 (Tx.
Comm. App. 1929) (that board was elected is recited in statement of facts but not
relied on in the opinion). Even a broad definition of education does not, of course,
mean that the school board can spend money for all purposes. See, e.g., McGilvra v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 113 Wash. 619, 194 P. 817 (1921), where the court struck
down a school board's plan for a medical clinic providing extensive services, including
dental and surgical operations, for all school children whose parents were unable to
pay for services elsewhere. The school board was elected, but the court made no
mention of this fact in its opinion. See also Barth v. School Dist., 393 Pa. 557, 143
A2d 909 (1958), in which the court held invalid an agreement between the Philadelphia School Board and the City of Philadelphia to establish jointly a Youth Conservation Commission for the purpose of organizing, formulating, operating and
financing a program to curb juvenile delinquency in Philadelphia. The court struck
down the agreement on the ground that the school board's participation in the program was beyond its educational function. It should be noted that the Philadelphia
school board is an appointed and not an elected board, although the court did not
mention this in the opinion. The significance of this fact in Barth may be lessened,
however, by the fact that the school board was acting in concert with the elected
municipal officials of the city.
69 See, e.g., B. BAILZoN, EDUCATioN IN THE FORmLNG OF AmEICAN SocInTY 14
(1960) ; J. DEwEY, DEmoc. cv AND EDucATION 11, 20, 321 (1961) ; N. McCLusxy,
PuBLic ScHooLs AND MoRAL EDUCATION (1958).
70 In addition to the general presumption against inferring delegation to school
boards of decision-making power in areas usually left to legislative judgment, there is
also a more specific rule prohibiting the delegation to administrative agencies of power
to prescribe or impose punishment. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Lyshe v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1921) :
And certainly we cannot conclude, in the absence of language admitting of no
other construction, that Congress intended that penalties for crime should be
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indoctrination can counter-indoctrinate at home; but parents whose
children have been coerced into following a course of conduct, or who
have been penalized for their actions, cannot counter so readily.
Of course, in deciding whether a "Marriage and Family Living"
course should be taught, and what its content should be if it is taught,
school authorities cannot escape making delicate value judgments.
This may, indeed, be a partial explanation of the prevalence of elected
school boards in this country. 71 Yet the value judgments involved in
such decisions are of different dimensions than those involved in
punishing student action that does not conform to a value system
prescribed by a school board. Forced conformity to a social value
system is the function of the representative, general legislature. Although we usually elect our school boards, as we do our state legislatures and municipal governments, we do not elect them to perform
this general legislative function.72 Moreover-to return to the example
enforced through the secret bindings and summary action of executive officers.
The guarantee of due process of law and trial by jury are not to be forgotten
or disregarded.
See 1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATrvE LAW 87-88 (1965) ; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACrION 109-115 (1965) ; Schwartz, 1952 Survey of New Growth

Basis-Administrative Law, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 928-29 (1952); Schwartz, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42
MICH. L. Rxv. 51 (1943).

71 It is impossible to state with any certainty the historical reasons for the elective
nature of most school boards in this country. The control of public education from
1642, the date of the famed Massachusetts School Ordinance, until well into the middle
of the 19th century, was in the hands of general local government, with no separate
educational agency. See R. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, at 85-88, 157-60. This seems
to have been an expression of the desire for popular control of education which has
persisted to this day. Id. at 104-09, 184-87. This may be explained in part by the
desire to maintain community control over expenditures, but in addition, important
social values are at stake when the school authorities determine curricular and other
matters of educational policy. See id. at 84-85; Eliot, supra note 52, at 1036-39.
In Iowa, this concern for popular control over education is reflected in a statute
allowing the electorate to vote directly at a regular election on matters such as choice
of textbooks or subjects to be taught. IowA CODE: ANN. tit. 12, § 278.1 (Supp. 1968).
While we are presently witnessing an increasing federal and state influence on local
school policy making, we are simultaneously observing a resurgence of interest in
community control of educational policy, particularly in large urban school districts
which are made up of different communities.
72 Compare Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), with Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Although school boards may be selected through
the political process, most people do not regard their members as politicians.
[Tihe dogma has evolved that public education must occupy a position above
the political conflicts that are waged over other public services, and educators
are supposed to abide by the maxim that politics and education do not mix.
In the eyes of the public, schools and their operations are removed, or should
be removed, from the arenas where other governmental decisions are made.
A candidate for a position on the local district school board, for example, often
escapes the stigma of a politician. Instead he is viewed as a good citizen who
is serving his community. True, if elected, he becomes a part of a local
governmental agency, but he becomes a part of an agency set apart or perhaps
set above other political units.
N. MAsTERs, R. SALIsBuRY & T. ELIOT, supra note 52, at 3-4. See also Cunningham,
supra note 11; Eliot, supra note 52, at 1032; R. CAMPBELL, supra note 45, at
83-85. This statement was written before the recent upsurge of interest in community
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of teenage marriage-the legislature has adopted a statutory scheme
that, within limits, leaves the question to private decision making by
the students and their parents. The imposition of sanctions by a school
board is an invasion of this legislatively sanctioned, private decisionmaking scheme.
This analysis does not imply that school boards may never employ
coercive rules as a device for education per se, that is, as a device to
educate students by instilling in them the belief that certain conduct
is disapproved by the school and is, therefore, somehow wrong. It
does mean that there is a strong presumption against the validity of
such rules, which can only be overcome by showing that, in a particular
situation, the educational need for such a device outweighs the opposing
factors involved." Thus, where married students are excluded from
school in order to teach other students that teenage marriage is undesirable, it seems clear that the opposing values far outweigh a school
board's interest in education per se. This exclusion forces the students
and their parents to choose between marriage and education. Thus
the exclusion operates as an invasion of a legislatively sanctioned,
private decision-making scheme and, in addition, runs counter to the
state policy norm of universal public education.74 Finally, the school
control of education in urban areas, yet it refers to areas where there has always been
community control, at least in theory. While this community control may be sufficient to support a governmental scheme involving educational expenditure and the
traditional educational policy decisions, it is inconsistent with a scheme of plenary
legislative power to make social decision. Moreover, school district boundaries are
not drawn in terms of appropriate community decision-making units, but rather in
terms of educationally functional units. According to a survey by the United States
Bureau of the Census, the boundaries of only about 'A of all school districts coincide
with those of any other unit of local government. BUREAU OF CENSUS, PUBLc
SCHOOL SYsTmS IN THE Uxrrao STATES 1961-62, at 2 (1962).

See generally

R. CA PBF.LL, supra note 45, at 100-09.
T3 Between the two poles of curricular offerings and compulsory rules of conduct,
are school board rulings making it mandatory for students to take specific courses. In
light of the analysis offered here, it is not surprising that courts are split over whether
school boards have such power. Compare State ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95
Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914) ; Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App.
696, 205 P. 49 (1921) ; Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303,
(1877) ; State e.x rel. Sheibley v. School Dist., 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891) ;
Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874), with Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143 So. 2d
629 (1962) ; Sewell v. Board of Educ., 29 Ohio St. 89 (1876) ; Kidder v. Chellis, 59
N.H. 473 (1879) ; Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36 S.E.
920 (1900) ; Ruff v. Fisher, 115 Fla. 247, 155 So. 642 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
Required courses involve coercion of students and interference with parental desires
concerning the education of their children. Yet this coerced exposure to ideas is
different from coerced adherence to norms of conduct. (But see Mitchell v. McCall,
supra, where compulsory physical education was really a type of compelled conduct
rather than exposure). As such, it is a lesser invasion of the parental prerogative.
Even more significant, it is in keeping with the traditional function of education.
Compare the discussion in note 29 supra.
74 The most obvious illustration of this norm is the existence of compulsory attendance laws in all states with the exception of Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia (local option). It is significant that even these 3 states had such laws until
1955 when they were repealed apparently in response to school desegregation. For a
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board's education per se interest here is quite weak. Disapproval
of teenage marriage can be expressed through traditional instructional
techniques. Allowing married students to attend school would not
undercut this instruction since this would not appear to the students to
be a manifestation of school approval of teenage marriage. In no way
would the school board appear responsible for the marriage. The
student did not get married on the school grounds, and, indeed, a
school board could prohibit a marriage ceremony from taking place on
its grounds.7 5 The student arrived at school with a particular status:
being married. The school is in no way responsible for that status;
it merely accepts it, without approval.
At the opposite pole from the exclusion of married students would
be a school rule forbidding students from mutilating American flags
on school grounds during school hours, as a coercive device to instill
respect for flag and country. Here the educational interest is quite
strong and the countervailing factors minimal. The rule prevents an
act from taking place on school grounds during school hours. The
failure of the school board to impose sanctions against the act might
well be taken by the student body as an approval of it. Performing
the act at school may also increase its effect by providing an audience,
compilation of state compulsory school laws, see A. STRlNHInmt & C. SOKOLOWSKIr,
STATE LAW ON CoMpuLsoRy ATTENDANCE (1966).
In addition to compulsory attend-

ance laws there are state constitutional and legislative provisions that provide for
universal public education. Every state constitution except that of Connecticut has a
provision concerning public education. Virtually every one of these provisions authorizes the legislature to establish and maintain a system of free, public education.
A number of these provisions explicitly state that these free public schools shall be
open to all children in the state. For excerpts from the state constitutional provisions
on public education, see E. BOLMEmR, THE SCHooL IN THE LEGAL STRucTuRE 66-75
(1968). Finally, pursuant to these constitutional mandates, state legislatures have
established public schools which, in accordance with statutes, are usually open to all
resident children between certain ages, with only narrowly drawn exceptions. E.g.,
N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 1953):
A person over five and under twenty-one years of age is entitled to attend
the public schools maintained in the district or city in which such person
resides without the payment of tuition.
As indicated by the New York statute the ages during which a child nnay go to school
are much more inclusive than those during which he vmust go to school. In most
states the compulsory attendance requirement is from 7 to 16. The permissive age
normally begins at age 6 and extends to age 21. Thus the norm of universal public
education is not limited to compulsory education, but includes all students who are
"entitled," i.e., have a positive legal right, to attend school. See A. STEINHILKER &
C. SOKOLOWSKI, suzepra, at 12. As stated by the California Supreme Court in Ward v.
Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 50, 17 Am. R. 405, 410 (1874):
The advantage or benefit thereby vouchsafed to each child, of attending
public school is therefore, one derived and secured to it under the highest
sanction of positive law. It is, therefore, a right-a legal right-as distinctively so as the vested right in property owned is a legal right, and as such is
protected, and entitled to be protected by all the guarantees by which other
legal rights are protected and secured to the possessor.
See also, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
15 See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
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of fellow school-children, that the actor might otherwise be denied.
Furthermore, the rule's restrictions on the freedom of students and
their parents is not great.7
The rule merely prohibits students from
engaging in one particular activity during a specified part of the
day. Students are free, so far as this rule goes, to desecrate flags at
other times. The balance, therefore, is clearly on the side of the power
of the school board to adopt and enforce such a rule.
To generalize from these examples, the presumption against
coercive education per se rules can be overcome only where the
educational interest in such a rule clearly outweighs the countervailing
factors. The educational interest is apt to be quite strong when the
rule prohibits an affirmative act from taking place on school grounds
during school hours. In such a case, inaction on the part of the school
board may be interpreted by students as approval of, or at least
condonation of, the act. In these situations, the opposing factors are
also likely to be weak, as the students are deprived only of an opportunity
to commit an act during a limited part of the day. But where the
school board seeks to punish a student for an act committed outside
school, or a status with which he enters school, the educational interest
wanes and the countervailing factors wax.
Before leaving this discussion, let us explore four situations that
fall on the continuum between the married student and flag mutilation
cases: (1) exclusion of married students not from school entirely, but
only from extracurricular activities, as a "punitive action, designed to
humiliate and ridicule the . . . students before their classmates so as
to discourage other marriages . . . . ; 7 (2) exclusion from school
of unwed mothers as a device to teach other students that premarital
sex is unwise; (3) coercion of students to make a gesture of respect
towards the flag as a device to instill patriotism in the students, and
(4) enforcement of hair and dress regulations in order to instill the
virtues of good grooming, modesty, and good taste.
76 All 50 states and the District of Columbia prohibit desecration of the flag. The
statutes are collected in Hearings on H.R. 271 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 324-46 (1967). In addition, a recent
federal statute prohibits such desecration. Act of July 5, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-381,
82 Stat 291. The constitutionality of the New York statute is presently before the
Supreme Court. People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S2d 491
(1967), prob. juris. noted, 392 U.S. 923 (1968).
The criminality of the act, while emphasizing the polarity between this example
and the preceding one, is not necessary for the conclusion reached. On the analysis
presented here, a school could equally well prohibit hanging the President in effigy on
school grounds during school hours.
77The Attorney General of Michigan, who intervened on behalf of the student,
stated that the school board admitted this to be the sole basis for its rule excluding
married students from extracurricular activities in the case of Cochrane v. Board of
Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 391, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960).
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While courts generally have stricken down school rules that
suspend or expel married students, 78 they have generally upheld rules
that exclude married students from extracurricular activities." The
basis for this distinction seems to be a view that, whereas school
attendance itself is a "right," participation in extracurricular activity
is a mere "privilege." As stated by the Supreme Court of Utah:
We have no disagreement with the proposition advocated
that all students attending school should be accorded equal
privileges and advantages. But the participation in extracurricular activities must necessarily be subject to regulations
as to eligibility. Engaging in them is a privilege which may
be claimed only in accordance with the standards set up for
participation. It is conceded, as plaintiff insists, that he has
a constitutional right both to attend school and to get married. But he has no "right" to compel the Board of Education
to exercise its discretion to his personal advantage so he can
participate in the named activities."0
In this, as in other areas, a "right-privilege" dichotomy is an
oversimplification that hinders, rather than helps, analysis. 8' Whether
"8 See Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964); McLeod v. State
ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929) ; Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School Dist v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Alvin Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); cf. Nutt v.
Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929). But see State ex rel. Thompson v.
Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957) (expulsion for
remainder of term following marriage held reasonable); cf. State ex rel. Idle v.
Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op. 262, 175 N.E.2d 539 (1961) (mandatory withdrawal during
pregnancy held reasonable).
79 See Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967);
State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962) ; Kissick
v. Garland Independent School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ; Starkey
v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963). But cf. Cochrane v. Board
of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W2d 569 (1960) (lower court decision upholding school
board affirmed by an equally divided court, voting 4 for reversal on the merits, 3 for
affirmance on the merits, and 1 for affirmance on ground of mootness). Note that the
decisions that have upheld exclusion of married students from extracurricular activities
have not been based primarily on an education per se rationale, but on the rationale of
the host function discussed in text accompanying notes 112-19 infra.
8o Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 231, 381 P.2d 718, 721 (1963)
(footnotes omitted).
81 Compare the discussion and cases cited at notes 64 & 65 supra and accompanying
,text See also 1962 OHIo A-r'y GEN. REP. No. 2998. But see State ex rel. Baker v.
Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962). See generally Mathews v.
Board of Educ., 127 Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (1901).
Whether [a student's access to public school] be called a "right" or "privilege"
cannot be important, for in either view it was secured to the relator, and to
his children as well, by the positive provisions of law, and was to be enjoined
upon such terms and under such conditions and restrictions as the lawmaking
power, within constitutional limits, might impose.
Id. at 538, 86 N.W. at 1039 (quoting from State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390,
399, 70 N.W. 347, 349 (1897) ; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) ; see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Przilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HAgv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). A similar attempted distinction
between exclusion from school and exclusion only from extracurricular activities ap-
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participation in extracurricular activities is termed a right or a privilege,
it is an integral part of the education that a public school offers its
students."2 Students cannot be excluded from these activities except for
reasons consistent with the state's legal structure viewed as a whole, and
the place of school board decision-making in that structure. Of course,
complete exclusion from school differs from exclusion only from a
limited number of school activities, both in the effect on the student
and in the relative infringement on the state policy norm of universal
public education. Yet, the issue remains whether these differences
should produce a difference in result.
In terms of the education per se function, I do not think they
should. All school programs are typically subject to eligibility regulations. Exclusion of a student-by reason of his married statusfrom any school activity can be justified only if (1) the student's
marriage renders him uniquely unfit to participate in the given
activity,8 or (2) the lesser infringement of the student's freedom of
action tips a delicate balance in favor of the validity of the regulation.
In the case of marriage, as has already been argued, the balance is
hardly delicate: the school's educational interest is quite weak, and the
legislature has expressly left the sensitive question of teenage marriage
to the private decision of the students and parents concerned.
Similarly, the exclusion of unwed mothers from school as an
education per se device results in punishment for an act, premarital sex,
that took place outside the school premises, or for a status, being an
pears to have been operative in school board decisions concerning high school fraternities. A number of states regulate membership in these fraternities through legislative
enactments, and expulsions pursuant to these statutes have been universally upheld;
see authorities cited note 8 mipra. Courts have split on the power of school boards to
prohibit fraternities without specific statutory authority. For cases upholding school
board action, see Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441, 86 P. 642 (1906); Wilson v.
Board of Educ., 233 Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908) ; Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223
N.C. 763, 28 S.E2d 527 (1944); Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist., 190
S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; cf. Isrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark. 580, 197 S.W.2d
39 (1946). See also Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103, 191 N.E. 407 (1934). However,
in Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1927), the Missouri Supreme
Court, in a well considered opinion, held such a board rule invalid. See also State
ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 (1882) ; Wilson v. Abilene Independent School
Dist., supra at 412, where the court held "that the attempt on the part of the Board to
extend such regulations to cover the period during which the school was in summer
vacation would be an undue invasion of parental authority." Despite the prevalence
of anti-fraternity statutes that provide for the expulsion of fraternity members, none of
the nonstatutory cases involve school board rules that attempt to exclude students
from school altogether. Rather they all punish fraternity members by excluding them
solely from extracurricular activities, such as holding class offices, and receiving
academic honors. But cf. Antell v. Stokes, supra. As with exclusion of married
students from such activities, the validity of these rules cannot be based on the student's
lack of a right to participate in these events and activities. Such rules can only be
upheld as a legitimate exercise of school board power if made in pursuance of a proper
educational objective. See text accompanying notes 118-19 infra.
82 Cf. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194, 197 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
8
can think of no such situations, with the possible exception of the fraternity
members running for school office, discussed in note 119 infra.
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unwed mother, with which the student entered the school. The
educational interest is as weak here as with the married student. The
unwed mother has the same interest as the married student in access
to education. However, as in the flag case, there is not as great an
invasion of areas left by the legislature to individual choice as there
is with married students. The legislature has not expressly left the
decision whether to engage in premarital sex to private decision
making. Indeed, statutes often make such conduct illegal. Nevertheless, the presumption against education per se rules and the strong
policies favoring universal public education still outweigh the weak
educational interest.
The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Education v.
Barnette,8" struck down a state requirement that students salute the
flag on the ground that such a requirement compelled a declaration of
belief in violation of the first amendment, as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. In so holding, the Court acknowledged that the state may require teaching by instruction in and study
of those aspects of our history and of the structure and organization
of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend
to inspire patriotism and love of country. 5 The Court found the
compulsory flag salute, however, to be of a different order entirely.
Here . . . we are dealing with a compulsion of students

to declare a belief. They are not merely made acquainted
with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to what
it is or even what it means. The issue here is whether the
slow and easily neglected route to aroused loyalty constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute
and slogan.'
Barnette, of course, involved a state statute rather than a school
board rule compelling a flag salute, and its constitutional holding is
not directly relevant to the problem at hand. Yet, the Court's view that
there is a qualitative difference between course instruction in values
and compelled obedience to those same values is a view generally felt
in our society, and it supports the presumption against school board
power to compel obedience to value norms through coercive education
per se rules.
Constitutional considerations aside, then, the problem is whether
this presumption is overcome by educational need. Unlike the married
student and unwed mother cases, we are not here confronted by out-of84319 U.S. 624 (1943).
85 Id. at 631 (quoting dissent in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
604 (1940)).
86 319 U.S. at 631 (footnotes omitted).
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school conduct or status. The failure to salute the flag takes place-in
school. Unlike mutilation of the flag, however, this conduct is passive
rather than active. This difference is significant for two reasons.
First, the aura of school approval is thereby lessened. The school
does not provide a forum for extraordinary action on the part of the
student; rather, the student is the captive of the school, and seeks only
to be let alone. Second, this rule imposes greater restraints on the
individual student's freedom of choice than does a rule prohibiting the
desecration of a flag at school. The student who wants to mutilate the
flag has only to refrain from doing so for that period of time he must
spend in school. The affirmative act of saluting the flag is irrevocable.
On balance, it would appear that the school board, even aside from
constitutional problems, does not have power under its education
per se function to require a student to salute the flag87
This leaves hair and dress regulations, sought to be justified as a
means of instilling the virtues of good grooming, modesty, and good
taste. It is interesting to note that in the recent spate of hair and dress
cases,88 virtually no school board has placed reliance on the education
S7 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the earlier case in
which a compulsory flag salute was upheld by the Court over only one dissent, involved
a local Pennsylvania school board ruling rather than a state statute. A federal district

court enjoined enforcement of the school board's rule, holding that it violated both

the Pennsylvania Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The court touched upon the state law problem, whether such a school board
ruling was within the statutory power of the board, but did not really decide that issue.
21 F. Supp. 581, 587-88 (E.D. Pa. 1937) (motion to dismiss denied), 24 F. Supp. 271
(E.D. Pa. 1938) (injunction granted). On appeal the judgment was affirmed. 108
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939). The circuit court's opinion is not clear as to the basis of the
affirmance, but the lack of reference to the Pennsylvania Constitution indicates that it
was based solely on the Federal Constitution. There is no discussion of the state
statutory law problem in the court of appeals' opinion. The court of appeals, however,
in distinguishing three per curiam Supreme Court decisions that had upheld the constitutionality of statutory compulsory flag salute, did rely upon the fact that Gobitisr
involved only a school board ruling.
In each [of these cases], both the State legislature declared, and the highest
state court affirmed, a policy of flag saluting. By reason of this legislative
and judicial determination, the connection betveen an omission to salute the
flag and the commission of an injury to the public weal, becomes legally and
factually closer [citations omitted]. But here there is no such declaration
or affirmance of policy. The legislature of Pennsylvania has gone no further
than to prescribe the teaching of civics.
Id. at 693. In light of this background, it is surprising that neither Mr. justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion nor Mr. Justice Stone's dissent discusses any state law
issues. Indeed, the majority opinion states, without explanation or citation, that
"[tihe case before us must be viewed as though the legislature of Pennsylvania had
itself formally directed the flag-salute for the children of Minersville." 310 U.S. at
597. But see Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).: "We are not reviewing merely the action of a local school board." The
opinion in Gobltir then goes on to rest upon the inadvisability of judicial interference
with this hypothetical "legislative judgment."
88 In light of the number of recent cases on the subject of school control of hair
and dress and the general ferment concerning the issue, it is startling to note that there
are only a handful of hair and dress cases predating the 1960's. See Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923) (upholding a school board resolution that
stated: "The wearing of transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses or any style of
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per se function as a justification for such regulations. Rather, reliance
is put on the argument that atypical dress is disruptive of the educational process, a justification derived from the host function. 9 For
purposes of this analysis, however, let us assume that an education
per se rationale is employed as the basis for regulations concerning
the length of boys' hair and girls' skirts. Regulations concerning the
length of boys' hair are only a shade removed from regulations excluding married students from school or extracurricular activities.
Although no legislature has ever expressly delineated this concern as
one of private choice, such decisions in our society have traditionally
been left to individuals. Long hair is a preexisting condition with
which the student enters school and for which the school does not
appear responsible. Denying a boy the opportunity to wear long hair
in school is a major invasion of his freedom of choice. Flags can be
mutilated outside of school, but hair cannot be long outside of school
and short in school."0 On the education per se rationale, therefore, the
balance is clearly against school board power to dictate the length
of boys' hair.
Short skirts present a more difficult question. As some educators
have recognized, dress regulations, short of those directed against
obscene or clearly inappropriate dress (such as bathing suits) may not
be educationally sound." They would seem to violate the wise counsel
of Emerson in the quotation with which this article began. Yet, the
clothing tending toward immodesty in dress, or the use of face paint or cosmetics is
prohibited"; and upholding the enforcement of such resolution by expulsion of an
18-year-old girl who came to school with talcum powder on her face) ; Valentine v.
Independent School Dist., 187 Iowa 555, 174 N.W. 334 (1919), 191 Iowa 1100, 184
N.W. 134 (1921) (invalidating a rule providing that a high school senior could not
receive a diploma unless she wore a cap and gown to commencement, but stating that
the student could be precluded from commencement itself-and forced to receive the
diploma privately-if she did not wear cap and gown) ; Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass.
103, 191 N.E. 407 (1934) (upholding a ban against fraternity sweaters) ; Jones v.
Day, 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921) (construing a rule requiring high school
students to wear khaki uniforms in school to apply at all times to boarders, but not
to day students when under parental control); Stromberg v. French, 60 N.D. 750,
236 N.W. 477 (1937) (upholding a rule against metal heel plates, discussed in text
accompanying notes 94-95 infra). See also Matheson v. Brady, 202 Ga. 500, 43
S.E.2d 703 (1947) ; McCaskill v. Bower, 126 Ga. 341, 54 S.E. 942 (1906) ; Colorado
ex rel. Lamme v. Buckland, 84 Colo. 240, 269 P. 15 (1928) ; Connell v. Craig, 33
Okla. 591, 127 P. 417 (1912) ; cf. the 1874 decision of the New York State Superintendent of Public Education holding that a local school board has no power to expel
a child of 9 because her mother refused to comply with a school rule as to the mode
in which the child's hair should be arranged, cited in In re Dalrymple, 5 N.Y. ED. DEP'T
REP. 113, at 116-17 (1966).
89 See notes 147-57 infra, and accompanying text.
9OBut see Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968), resting affirmance of such a regulation partly on the
availability of wigs. 392 F.2d at 704.
VlSee Friedenberg, Ceremonies of Humiliation in School, EDuc. DIG., Nov. 1966,
at 35; Garratt, The Battling Teenagers, 45 OHIO ScHooLs, Sept. 1967, at 26, 46; cf.
Howard, Student Dress, School Policies and the Law, EDUc. DiG., May 1967, at 35.
See generally E. FRIEDENBERG, COMING OF AGE IN AmicA (1965).
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question is not whether such regulations are wise, but whether the
school board has the power, in connection with its interest in education
per se, to impose reasonable dress regulations. 2
Short skirts, like long hair, are a preexisting condition with which
the student enters the school building. Thus, there is less of a sense
of school responsibility for, or approval of, such conduct than there is,
for example, in the one-shot act of mutilating a flag. On the other
hand, skirts can be quickly changed for out-of-school activity; hair
cannot. In addition, dress-unlike hairstyle-is not a concern that
has traditionally been considered one exclusively reserved for private
decision making. Laws restricting wearing apparel to preserve
modesty are not unknown in this country, and admission to public
places is often conditioned on the wearing of "appropriate" dress.
This is still a close case, but on balance I would conclude that school
boards do have the power to adopt reasonable restrictions on dress
as an education per se device. 3
In concluding this discussion of the school board's education per se
function, it is well to remember that this function has rarely been
relied upon to sustain school board rules, nor has this function ever been
the sole, or even the primary basis for sustaining such a rule. This
undoubtedly reflects the general distaste in our society for coercive
education per se rules except those regulating affirmative student
conduct that takes place on school grounds, conduct for which there is
92 Although this article is concerned with the scope of school board substantive
rulemaking power, it must be remembered that even when the board adopts a rule
within that power, the rule cannot be upheld where it is "unreasonable." Thus, even
though one might hold that a school board could adopt rules governing dress in school,
a rule against girls' wearing slacks might well be considered unreasonable where it
was applied to exclude from school a girl who wore otherwise unobjectionable slacks
in 6-degree weather because she had been ill, had to walk over a mile to school, and
the school itself was so constructed as to require her to walk outdoors to go from one
class to another. Indeed the application of such a rule was struck down by the New
York Commissioner of Education. In re Dalrymple, 5 N.Y. ED. DFp'T REP. 113, at
116-17 (1966).

13 The issue of dress appropriate to place and occasion raises the problem of a
school board rule designed to create or maintain a proper educational atmosphere.
As stated in note 59 spra, this power is so related to education per se as to be really
a part of that function.
Those acts or conditions which the school authorities would want to discourage
as education per se tend to be those that the school authorities would also want to
discourage as not being a part of a good educational atmosphere. Each of the cases
discussed under education per se herein could be rephrased in terms of educational
atmosphere. The interests involved in the two concepts are also the same so long as
the good "educational atmosphere" relates to incremental additions to learning atmosphere, not to activities that threaten actual disruption of the educational process.
It is in the sense of incremental additions to learning that I am using the term "educational atmosphere," and, when used in that sense, I see no need for an analysis distinct
from the education per se discussion in the text. When the situation involves disruption of the educational process, however, other factors become operative. These factors
are similar to those analyzed under the host function and thus will be discussed later
in the article.
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a sense of immediate school board responsibility and approval unless
disapproved.
B. The Host Function
Unlike the education per se rationale, various components of the
host function have been employed by school boards to justify regulation
of pupil conduct and status. The most basic of these components
would seem to be protection of the physical plant. For example, the
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the validity of a school board
prohibition against the wearing of metal heel plates partly on the
ground that these plates caused more than normal wear on the school
floors. 4 But even this rule, serving the basic host function, caused the
court considerable concern. It was upheld only after the court found
that the interest of the boy and his parents in his wearing the metal
plates was relatively insignificant. 5
An even more striking example of the narrowness of a school
board's power to act to protect the physical plant is the judicial denial,
absent explicit statutory authority, of the power of a school board to
coerce the payment of damages for destruction of its property by careless students. In the 1880 Iowa case of Perkins v. Independent School
District,9 6 a student playing ball in the schoolground unintentionally,
but carelessly; batted the ball through a window. A school board rule
required the student to pay for the damage. Perkins did not pay and
was indefinitely excluded from school. In an action for reinstatement
the court was called upon to decide "whether defendants, as school
directors, had authority to promulgate and enforce the rule under
which plaintiff was excluded from school." 17 The court saw no power
in the school board to exclude students in order to secure payment of
a sum of money, and answered the question in the negative." Perkins
I Stromberg v. French, 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477 (1931). There was also the
element of disruptive noise caused by the plates.
95 The court noted that there was evidence that heel plates were a fad rather than
a matter of practical advantage, id. at 753, 236 N.W. at 478, and that there was "no
hardship or indignity imposed upon the plaintiff or his son by [the rule]." Id. at 756,
236 N.W. at 480. Under these circumstances the court found that the school interests
in protecting the floors and preventing disruptive noise were more important than
those of the parent. In so doing the court recognized that "in most instances, the right
of the parent is paramount, but sometimes the interests of the public generally require
that the parent shall give way." Id. at 756, 236 N.W. at 480.

656 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356 (1880).
at 479, 9 N.W. at 357.
*8In the words of the court:
97Id.

It will be observed that plaintiff was guilty of no breach of discipline or of any
offense against good order.
By an accident and without any evil purpose he broke a window-glass.
The rule requires him to pay the damage done and in default thereof authorizes

SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY

has been followed by two other courts. 9 Thus, even the most basic
component of the host function has been limited in light of other
societal values.
School board power to promulgate coercive rules in order to
safeguard students in its charge has also been so limited. There is
no doubt that, even without explicit statutory authority, a school board
may exclude from school any person with a contagious disease. But
despite some authority to the contrary, the predominant rule is that,
absent the existence of smallpox in the community or other factors
showing a clear and imminent danger of a smallpox outbreak, a school
the directors to exclude him from the school. We may admit that he ought
to pay the damages and is liable therefor but we think his omission to perform this duty cannot be punished by expulsion from the school. The State
does not deprive its citizens of their property or their liberty, or of any rights,
except as a punishment for a crime. It would be very harsh and obviously
unjust to deprive a child of education for the reason that through accident
and without intentipn of wrong he destroyed property of the school district.
Doubtless a child may be expelled from school as a punishment for a breach
of discipline or for offenses against good morals, but not for innocent acts.
In this case the plaintiff was expelled not because he broke the glass, but
because he did not pay the damage sustained by the breaking. His default in
this respect was no breach of good order or good morals. The rule requiring
him to make payment is not intended to secure good order but to enforce an
obligation to pay a sum of money.
We are clearly of the opinion that the directors have no authority to
promulgate or enforce such a rule.
Id. at 479-80, 9 N.W. at 357.
99 State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266 (1888) ; Holman v. School Trustees, 77 Mich. 605, 43 N.W. 996 (1889). In Holman, as in Perkins, the sanction for
nonpayment was exclusion. In Vanderbilt, the sanction was corporal punishment. At
first impression the results of these cases are quite troublesome. There is no doubt
that school boards can protect the physical premises and take action to obtain redress
for damages incurred. These three cases also assumed that the pupils involved would
be civilly liable in tort for the damage negligently caused. But the sanction of exclusion used by the school boards in Perkins and Hohnan,runs counter to the norm of
universal access to tuition-free public education. See Opinion of Attorney General
of Oregon, 32 Op'. ATr'y GEN. 444 (1966); Morris v. Vandiver, 164 Miss. 476, 145
So. 228 (1933). Moreover, that type of severe sanction is not in accord with the
limited means the law now accepts to coerce the payment of civil debts. This may
have been what the Perkins court was referring to when it stated that "[t]he state
does not deprive its citizens of their property or their liberty, or of any rights, except
as punishment for a crime." 56 Iowa at 479, 9 N.W. at 357.
Vanderbilt, on the other hand, did not involve exclusion from school but only
corporal punishment. This might be the type of limited sanction that the school board
is empowered to employ, even without more explicit statutory authority, in aid of its
function of maintaining school property or, pursuant to its interest in education per se,
as a means of teaching the need to pay one's just debts. Cf. Bolding v. State, 23 Tex.
App. 172, 4 S.W. 579 (1887); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 153 (1965),
quoted in note 29 supra. Vanderbilt could, however, be read as a recognition of the
fact that the parents, rather than the child, are the persons actually controlling payment, and that the child is being corporally punished for a default beyond his control.
Cf. State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145 (1878) (impermissible to punish student who does
not know reason for punishment).
Recognizing the problem discussed here, a number of states have passed statutes
holding parents liable for their children's defacement of school property, and providing
for suspension of the child until payment is made. For cases upholding or construing
such statutes, see Board of Educ. v. Hansen, 56 N.J. Super. 567, 153 A.2d 393 (1959) ;
General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963) ; Lamro
Independent Consol. School Dist. v. Cawthorne, 76 S.D. 106, 73 N.W.2d 337 (1955).
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board may not exclude an unvaccinated child from school without
explicit statutory authority to do so." ° The decision whether to
vaccinate a child may be a particularly sensitive one involving parental
control of medical treatment and, sometimes, religious principles. While
even these interests may be overridden by the exercise of state police
power through a legislative enactment, absent such an explicit legislative delegation of this power to a school board, the general function
and role of the school board do not encompass it. In the absence of
a grave emergency, such as the imminent outbreak of serious disease,
the balancing of public and private interests involved in a compulsory
vaccination rule is a task for the legislature. 0'
As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in 1897:
While school directors and boards of education are
invested with power to establish, provide for, govern and
regulate public schools, . . . they have no authority to ex-

clude children from the public schools on the ground that they
refuse to be vaccinated, unless, indeed, in cases of emergency,
in the exercise of the police power, it is necessary, or reasonably appears to be necessary, to prevent the contagion of
small-pox. Undoubtedly, also, children infected with or exposed to small-pox may be temporarily excluded or the school
be temporarily suspended; but, like the exercise of similar
power in other cases, such power is justified by the emergency,
and, like the necessity which gives rise to it, ceases when the
necessity ceases. No one would contend that a child could be
permanently excluded from a public school because it had been
exposed to small-pox, or that the school could be permanently
100 See Burroughs v. Mortenson, 312 Ill. 163, 143 N.E. 457 (1924); Potts v.
Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 47 N.E. 81 (1897) ; Mathews v. Board of Educ., 127 Mich. 530, 86
N.W. 1036 (1901) ; cf. Hammond v. Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29, 80 N.E. 650 (1907) ;
State ex rel. O'Bannon v. Cole, 220 Mo. 697, 119 S.W. 424 (1909); Hutchins v.
School Comm., 137 N.C. 68, 49 S.E. 46 (1904); Duffield v. School Dist., 162 Pa. 476,
29 A. 742 (1894) ; Glover v. Board of Educ., 14 S.D. 139, 84 N.W. 761 (1900). But
see Booth v. Board of Educ., 70 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Staffel v. San
Antonio School Bd., 201 S.W. 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). Similarly, the prevailing
rule is that, absent explicit statutory authority, boards of health have no power to
require vaccination of school children unless there is an imminent danger of a smallpox
outbreak. See Potts v. Breen, supra; Osborn v. Russell, 64 Kan. 507, 68 P. 60 (1902) ;
Rhea v. Board of Educ., 41 N.D. 449, 171 N.W. 103 (1919) ; State ex rel. Adams v.
Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347 (1897) ; cf. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89
(1900); State ex rel. Freeman v. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 353, 90 N.W. 783 (1902);
State ex rel. Cox v. Board of Educ., 21 Utah 401, 60 P. 1013 (1900) ; State ex rel.
Lehman v. Partlow, 119 Wash. 316, 205 P. 420 (1922). But see State v. Martin, 134
Ark. 420, 204 S.W. 622 (1918).
10 1 Courts have been unanimous in upholding the validity of rules providing for
the exclusion of unvaccinated children from school, even absent an imminent danger
of smallpox, where such exclusion was pursuant to a statutory requirement, see, e.g.,
Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 P. 383 (1890) ; Spofford v. Carleton, 238 Mass. 528,
131 N.E. 314 (1921) ; N. EDWARDS, .rtpra note 11, at 574-75, and cases there cited;
A. FLOwERS & E. BOLmIER, supra note 11, at 94-97 and cases there cited, or to a
statute explicitly delegating to the school board the power to decide to exclude nonvaccinated children, see Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394
(1959) ; cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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closed because of the remote fear that the disease of small-pox
might appear in the neighborhood, and that if the school
should then be open and children in attendance upon it the
public would be exposed to the contagion. And upon the
same line of reasoning, without a law making vaccination
compulsory, or prescribing it, upon the grounds deemed sufficient by the legislature as necessary to the public health, as
a condition of admission to or attendance upon the public
schools, neither the state board nor any local board has any
power to make or enforce a rule or order having the force of
a general law in the respects mentioned. 0
Sometimes analogized to the protection of children from the carriers of contagious disease is the protection of children from the
carriers of moral pollution. The classic case in this area is the 1851
Massachusetts case of Sherman v. Inhabitantsof Charlestown03° Miss
Sherman was expelled from the Charlestown public schools on grounds
that she was immoral. More specifically, the school board maintained
that, with a named man, she engaged in "a continued course of open
and notorious familiarities, and actual illicit intercourse, and that for
hire and reward." Io There was, however, no allegation of any misconduct in school. Nor was there any allegation that Miss Sherman's
out-of-school conduct was such that it disrupted the educational process
in any way. Rather, the exclusion was justified by the school board
and upheld by the courts solely as a means of protecting Miss Sherman's
classmates from contact with her polluting influence. In the words
of the court, it is as proper a purpose of the school administrators "to
preserve the pure-minded, ingenuous and unsuspecting children of
both sexes, from the contaminating influence of those of depraved
sentiments and vicious propensities and habits, as from those infected
with contagious diseases."

3o5

This rationale has been used to justify the suspension of a boy for
being "drunk and disorderly" on Christmas day in the streets of the
town in violation of an Arkansas town ordinance,'0 0 as well as the
102 Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 75, 47 N.E. 81, 84 (1897).
The reference to the
"state board" in the quotation is to the state board of health which had also promul-

gated a rule excluding unvaccinated children from school. See note 99 supra. There
have been cases in which boards of health have sought to have unvaccinated children
excluded and school boards have refused to exclude them. When this has occurred
and the board of health does have the power to adopt its rule (i.e., there is an imminent danger of smallpox, see note 100 supra), the courts have held that the
school board must defer to the board of health and exclude the children. See State
ex rel. Home v. Bail, 157 Ind. 25, 60 N.E. 672 (1901) ; Board of Trustees v. McMurtry, 169 Ky. 457, 184 S.W. 390 (1916) ; People ex rel Hill v. Board of Educ.,

224 Mich. 388, 195 N.W. 95 (1923).
103 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160 (1851).
-0 4 Id. at 162.

10 5 Id. at 167.
106Douglass v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211 (1909).
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1922 expulsion of an eighteen-year-old girl from a M/ichigan normal
college for smoking in public off campus and for riding in cars while
seated on boys' laps.'0 7

Under the same rationale, school boards have

formulated policies, often upheld by courts, prohibiting married
students, 08 pregnant students,' 09 and unwed mothers 110 from participating in school activities or even from attending school at all.
Recently, a federal district judge in Mississippi, in denying a preliminary injunction to prevent the exclusion of an unwed mother from
school, put forth the following justification for the rule:
Obviously, the policy not to admit unwed mothers as
students in, this school system [and the related policy to
expel pregnant students] is based upon what this court
judicially knows to be a belief held by a large segment of the
people in this area (perhaps, by a majority) that it is sinful,
or immoral for unwed people to engage in sexual intercourse
and that an unwed mother is not a fit associate:for teenage
children in 'apublic school or elsewhere. The fact of such
motherhood demonstrates such sinful, or immoral conduct.
. . . By analogy, plaintiff's situation could well be
likened to that of a typhoid carrier who otherwise is an
acceptable student in every way. The only real difference is
that the carrier is one who acquired that status without
fault, while plaintiff's status is the result of her own wrongdoing. Medical opinion and enlightened public opinion agree
that the presence of a typhoid carrier as a student in a public
school would present a threat to the health of all other
students, the faculty and staff. Public opinion, enlightened
or not, in the Grenada School territory, identified an unwed
0
1 7 Tanton

v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).

108 See notes 1-2, 78-79 supra.
109

See note 4 supra. State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlin, 12 Ohio Misc. 44, 175

N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961), is the only case I have found concerning the suspension of
pregnant students. In that case the court upheld a school board rule requiring pregnant students to "withdraw" from school attendance "immediately upon knowledge of
pregnancy." In so doing, the court rejected the opinion of the Attorney General of
Ohio that the school board was not empowered to make such a rule. See also the
opinion of the State Law Department of Maryland as expressed in a letter from
Thomas G. Pullen, Jr., State Superintendent of Schools to the School Superintendents
of Maryland, Mar. 31, 1964 and Resolution No. 1967-43 of the Maryland State Board
of Education, re: Bylaw 720:3, adopted July 26, 1967.
110 See note 5 slupra. School board policies toward mothers, wed or unwed, have
not been the subject of either extensive judicial decision or sociological study. In
Alvin Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), the
court held that the school board had no power to adopt a rule excluding mothers
from school. In this Case, the child was apparently conceived in wedlock, but the
court did not seem to give any weight to that fact in its opinion. In Nutt v. Board
of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929), the court held that a school board could
not exclude a married mother as such from school even though her child had been
conceived out of wedlock. But see Perry v. Grenada Mun. Separate School Dist.,
Civ. No. W.C. 6736 (N.D. Miss., Dec. 27, 1967).
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mother of school age as a threat to the moral health, particularly of all other teenage school girls."'
If the issue is whether it is a permissible function of a school board
to guard its students from serious moral pollution as it guards them
from serious physical disease, the court's argument is a valid one.
Students are compelled to congregate in school, and the school administration may appropriately protect them from the dangers of this close
contact. Protection from serious moral disease would seem as
important as protection from serious physical disease. But this is not
conclusive. Board power to protect against physical disease and
danger through the promulgation of coercive rules is not unlimited.
Exercise of that power is valid only where the interests of the host
function clearly outweigh the other social interests involved."' This
same limitation, of course, applies to school board power to exclude
the carriers of moral pollution.
As examples, let us take the exclusion from school of married
students and of unwed mothers. Some school administrators have
attempted to justify exclusion of married students, in part, on the
grounds that other children should not be exposed to married students,
who presumably engage in sexual intercourse and who thus might
stimulate premarital sexual activity in their fellow students." 3 Such
action against married students not only penalizes conduct authorized
by the legislature but also seriously restricts the private decision making
of students and their parents, and runs counter to the policy norm of
universal public education. Therefore, as in the case of danger of
physical disease, absent statutory authorization to the contrary, a school
board should be able to exclude married students, if, and only if, the
presence of such a student creates a clear and imminent danger of
serious harm to the moral health of his fellow students." 4
Il Perry v. Grenada Mun. Separate School Dist, Civ. No. W.C. 6736 (N.D.
Miss., Dec. 27, 1967).
112 This test is met only where there is an imminent and clear danger of serious
disease. See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra. Thus the imminent danger
criterion is essential primarily for the determination that the school interest of protecting its charges from danger prevails over the other interests involved. However,
it also has the secondary effect of lessening the invasion of other interests; the imminent danger test will usually result in a temporary, not a permanent, restriction of
a child's right to attend school. See Mathews v. Board of Educ., 127 Mich. 530, 536,

86 N.W. 1036, 1037 (1901).

"3 See, e.g., the views expressed in School Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147
N.W.2d 854 (1967); Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569
(1960) ; L. G. Carroll, supra note 2, at 187-210; W. Ivis, .rupra note 2, at 57-58;
Landis & Kidd, supra note 2, at 132-33; Sperry & Thompson, mipra note 2, at 103-04.
1141t could be argued that, in this area, the legislative scheme preempts the school

board, so that under no circumstances could the board restrict the attendance or participation of married students. See Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103

N.W2d 569 (1960); Alvin Independent School Dis. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.
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Protection against moral pollution also may be used to justify
exclusion from school of unwed mothers." 5 It may be argued that
such a rule is quite different from that excluding married students.
Of course, there are differences. There is no legislative pronouncement
that premarital sexual relations are a subject for private decision
making. Indeed, such conduct is frequently made criminal. Nevertheless, there is still the countervailing norm of universal public
education. As stated by the Kansas Supreme Court in upholding the
right of a mother to attend school when her child was conceived out
of wedlock but born after her marriage:
The public schools are for the benefit of children within
school age, and efficiency ought to be the sole object of those
charged with the power and privilege of managing and conducting the same, and while great care should be taken to
preserve order and proper discipline, it is proper also to see
that no one within school age should be denied the privilege
of attending school unless it is clear that the public interest
demands the expulsion of such pupil or a denial of his right
to attend. On the record submitted here, we are of the
opinion the evidence was insufficient to warrant the board in
excluding plaintiff's daughter from the school of Goodland.
It is the policy of the state to encourage the student to equip
himself with a good education. The fact that the plaintiff's
daughter desired to attend school was of itself an indication of
character warranting favorable consideration. Other than the
fact that she had a child conceived out of wedlock no sufficient
reason is advanced for preventing her from attending school.
Her child was born in wedlock and the fact that her husband
may have abandoned her should not prevent her from gaining
an education which would better fit her to meet the problems
of life." 6
Moreover, while condemning premarital sex, society does not completely reject the unwed mother. On the contrary, many states have
instituted extensive programs designed to aid her. This social scheme
of aid and rehabilitation of the unwed mother may be impeded by her
Civ. App. 1966) ; McLeod v. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929). Yet such a
rule would seem to go too far in limiting school board power under the statutory
grants of power to operate the schools. The state legislature has said that teenage
marriages are permissible. Yet, they have not said that under all circumstances
married teenagers can attend public school. While there are usually some specific
statutory bases for exclusion from school based on age, residence, or ability to learn,
as the cases cited throughout this article show, these specific statutory bases for exclusion have not been held to be exclusive. Under its general grant of power a school
board may still exclude others when it is performing a valid function that is deemed to
prevail over the other social interests involved.
115 See Atkyns, supra note 2, at 71.
116 Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 509, 278 P. 1065, 1066 (1929).
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exclusion from school."1 '

In terms of the host function, therefore, I

would conclude that, in the words of the Kansas court, it is "clear that
the public interest demands the expulsion" of unwed mothers only if
their presence presents a clear and imminent danger of serious harm
to their fellow students.
This again brings us to a variant of the married student's situation: exclusion not from school entirely, but only from extracurricular
activities. Three arguments could be advanced to support this partial
exclusion in cases in which a total exclusion is not justified. The first
relates to a different type of moral pollution than we have been discussing. School boards have sometimes tried to guard against the
danger that other students might decide to emulate married students by
getting married themselves, a danger that is said to increase when
married students are permitted to attain such high status positions as
star athlete and class president."'8 The question arises whether it is
1 17
See generally C. VINCENT, UNMA I IED MOTHEms 6-30 (1961).
Remember
that I am here speaking of involuntary exclusion from school of the unwed mother who

wants to attend school. As the court stated in Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507,
278 P. 1065 (1929), "The fact that the plaintiff's daughter desired to attend school
was of itself an indication of character warranting favorable consideration." Id. at
509, 278 P. at 1066; cf. Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky. 1964).
For discussion of the role of the school in relation to the "delinquent" child, see
Moore, The Schools and the Problems of Juvenile Delinquency, 7 CRIME & DEI~NOne of the major difficulties with a rule excluding all unwed
QUENcY 201-212 (1961).
mothers from school is its lack of discrimination; cf. Board of Educ. v. Bentley,
supra at 680 ("[t]he fatal vice of the regulation lies in its sweeping, advance determination that every married student, regardless of circumstances, must lose at least
a year's schooling."). Not all unwed mothers are alike, either in the reasons for
their status or the value of school to them. See Clothier, The Unnarried Mother of
School Age as Seen by a Psychiatrist,39 MENTAL HYGIENE 631 (1955). However, the
differences between the experiences and obligation of mothers (wed or unwed) and
other students may be such as to support the view that the compulsory school laws do
not apply to mothers, and thus they can choose not to attend if they so desire. I have
found no authority on this precise issue, but there is some case support for the viev
that the compulsory school laws do not apply to married students. In re State ex rel.
Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 39 So2d 731 (1949) ; State v. Priest, 210 La. 389, 27 So.2d
173 (1946) ; In re Rodgers, 234 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Fain. Ct. 1962). But see State v.
Without any apparent statutory
Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958).
(see 24 P.S. §§ 13-1330 to -1334 (1962)) or judicial authority, the Philadelphia school
board has adopted the following rule:
In the event that a girl [who had been excluded from school because she was
pregnant] may not wish to return to school, and it is thought that readmission
will lead to social maladjustment, it would be inadvisable to force her to
return. For each such case, consideration should be given to the girl's
physical condition, her economic status, ability to profit by further education,
and the likelihood of sound social adjustment. It may be advisable to send
the girl to another school rather than the one formerly attended.
SCHooL DisT. OF PHrlLADEIPHIA, BULL No. 51, atpra note 4. For a good argument
that "delinquent" children should not be "allowed" to stay out of school and a recognition of the fact that the attitude of the school significantly affects a child's "voluntary" decision to stay out of school, see Greenstone, Getting the Returnee Back to
School, 7 Cunvn & DELINQUENCY 249-254 (1961). Again, however, the issue of involuntary exclusion from school is quite different than that of exemption from the
compulsory school laws. An involuntary exclusion must meet the requirements set
forth in the text.
118 See Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 394, 103 N.W.2d 569, 571
(1960) ; State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 226, 189 N.E.2d 181,
185 (1962).
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properly a part of the school board's host function to attempt to guard
against this emulation through the exclusion of married students from
these activities.
This is not an easy case, but I would conclude that a school board
cannot exclude married students from extracurricular activities in
order to prevent emulation of their status even if there is a clear and
imminent danger of such emulation. The state legislature has explicitly authorized teenage marriage with parental consent. The
possibility that students might be persuaded to take this perfectly legal
step is not the type of serious moral pollution that would justify a
coercive school board rule forcing the student to choose between marriage and a full education.
The second argument is that the greater informality involved in
extracurricular activities-particularly sports-creates a greater danger
of moral pollution in the sense of stimulation of premarital sexual
activities than does classroom contact. That is, the threat of moral
pollution in the locker room may be clear and imminent, whereas the
threat of moral pollution in the classroom may not. If this is so, then
the criteria for the determination of the primacy of a valid school
function are met and the school board has power to promulgate a rule
excluding married students from such extracurricular activities.
Finally, the two types of exclusion do differ in the seriousness
of their effect on the student in question, and the infringement of the
statutory norm of universal public education. It may be argued, therefore, that an exclusion from extracurricular activities may be upheld
even where there is no clear and imminent threat of serious moral harm
to other students growing out of participation in such activities. In
attempting to prevent serious moral pollution through school activities
the school board is pursuing a valid function. The strict requirement
of a clear and imminent threat is not necessary to the validity of the
function but serves to demarcate those situations in which the importance of the effectuation of the school board function is sufficient to
outweigh the fact that the school board rule affects and invades other
societal interests and the areas of other decision makers.
This balance is altered when the effect of the rule is not to exclude
the married student totally from school but only from extracurricular
activities. A board, therefore, should have the power to exclude married students from extracurricular activities if there exists a reasonable
likelihood that participation of these students in such activities would
lead to the serious moral pollution of their classmates that the board
has a right to prevent. While this standard is less stringent than that
required for exclusion of students from school completely, it is not a
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meaningless standard. It requires the factual existence of a reasonable
likelihood of serious moral contamination. It is not satisfied by school
board conjecture or vague reference to possible bad influences."'
The host function not only requires the protection of the majority
of students from the harmful influence of individual students, but also
requires the protection of students from risks created because school
attendance has brought a large group of children together in one place.
Thus, rules prohibiting students from driving their cars on school
grounds during school hours can easily be justified as a means of
protecting student pedestrians from harm.'
This aspect of the host
119 1 have not read any marital exclusion cases in which the facts (at least as
stated in the opinion) even approach this reasonable likelihood standard. Another
area in which school boards apparently have felt a difference between exclusion from
school entirely and exclusion only from extracurricular activities is that of membership
in high school fraternities. See notes 6 & 81 supra. In this regard there is a specific
argument addressed to the prohibition of fraternity members running for school office.
The contention is made that when allowed to run for class office the block voting of
fraternity members results in their having power out of proportion to their numbers.
See Holroyd v. Eibling, 174 Ohio St. 296, 188 N.E.2d 797 (1962). If this is in fact
true, may the school deny fraternity members the right to run for office? While I have
very serious doubts about the wisdom of such a rule, I think that it is valid. The
school board has both education per se and host functions involved in the electoral
process for school officers which should be sufficient to justify the rule on a showing
that there is, in fact, a reasonable likelihood of substantial disproportionate control of
school offices by fraternity members. I am fortified in this view by the idea that a
school board could conclude that to some extent, at least, the educational value that a
student derives from holding class office may be obtained by a fraternity member in
his fraternity participation.
2o McLean Independent School Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960). In this case the school board adopted a rule that "children driving automobiles to school shall park same in parking lot when they arrive at school and shall
not move same until 3:45 P.M. unless by special permission .

.

. ."

Plaintiff's

daughter was suspended when, following her parent's instructions, she persisted in
parking a block away from school and driving home at lunch time. The trial court
ordered reinstatement, finding the rule invalid as an unauthorized regulation of streets
and highways. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that "the actions of school
authorities in promulgating rules to insure the proper conduct and decorum of
students .

.

.

."

would be upheld unless a clear abuse of power or discretion were

shown. Id. at 888-89. The court concentrated on the need to protect the elementary
school pupils in playgrounds adjacent to the school parking lot and noted the board's
desire to prevent student joy rides through town during noon recess.
This protection of elementary school children is clearly a valid school board
function that should prevail over arguments asserting board interference with the
wishes of parents or the affairs of the agency in charge of highway regulation. Yet
the rationale does not really explain the McLean rule. This rule not only prohibited
those who parked in the lot from moving their cars, but also prohibited all driving at
noon recess. The court questioned whether the rule by its terms did apply when the
student parked a considerable distance from the school and then used the car at recess.
Technically they might not be "driving automobiles to school" but would still
be guilty of the principal acts the school authorities testified the regulation was
passed to prohibit, viz., driving their automobiles at the noon recess. We
would respectfully suggest that the purpose sought to be accomplished might
be more specifically stated in the following language: "School children shall
not be permitted to drive automobiles during the lunch period nor anytime
after they arrive at school each day until they leave at - P.M. (the time
school is dismissed for the day), unless by special permission of the school
authorities."
,!d.at 891. This suggested modification of the rule cannot be based on the rationale
of preventing harm to the small children. The basis for this rule can only be the
protection of the student driver himself, the protection of other students who ride with
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function also appears to be the basis for the general peacekeeping role
that schools have performed in regard to student misconduct on
school grounds and en route to and from school. In general, school
authorities have been held to have the power to discipline students
engaged in fighting, the use of foul language, and similar activities
during these periods."
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in the 1925 case of O'Rourke v.
Walker,' explicitly recognized this function. A student who lived
the student driver, or the protection of the rest of the community. The protection of
the student himself is not a valid school board function, see text accompanying notes
132-44 infra. Student driving is subject to state licensing requirements and parental
permission. Although the activity takes place during the "school day" it is during the
noon recess and its regulation is not functionally related to education. The rule as
applied to student drivers could only be sustained on an improper, non-functional
in loco parentis theory, see text accompanying notes 21-37 supra. Protection of the
student driver's companion is a more substantial school board function as the companion is forced to meet with the driver at school and thus the school provides his
opportunity to go joy riding. Protecting this student from this temptation may be
analogized to protecting him from physical or moral disease. Yet a rule against the
use of cars prevents their constructive as well as their destructive use. It may very
well be that the passenger's parents do not want to prohibit him from riding in a car
at recess. In the instant case the school board rule should be applied only in cases
where it supports parental wishes and not where it displaces them. Cf. Jones v. Cody,
132 Mich. 31, 92 N.W. 915 (1902) and text at notes 129-34 infra. Finally, there is the
issue of preventing harm to the rest of the community. While I have found no cases
supporting such a function, it seems valid for a school to minimize the risk of harm
to a neighborhood caused by having a school in its midst See REsTATEMrENT (SEcom)
OF TORTS, § 152 Comment a, at 270 (1965), stating that school authorities are privileged "to prevent the school from becoming a nuisance to the neighborhood." Id. at
271. Thus, in order to prevent congestion or monopolization of available on-street
parking in the area, the school board could adopt a rule requiring that all those who
drive to school park in the lot (This is part of the rule in McLean, although it is not
dealt with in the opinion, and was deleted from the court's suggested modification of
the rule.) Similarly the prohibition against moving cars from the parking lot at recess
might be supported as a reasonable means of preventing traffic congestion. However,
this rationale would not seem to embrace the McLean rule, which prohibited any
driving during the school day. The dangers of such driving are those normally associated with teenage driving and are not related in any way to school attendance.
General highway regulation and control of teenage driving are not within the power
granted to the educational authorities.
12 1 See O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 128 A. 25 (1925); Deskins v. Gose,
85 Mo. 485 (1885) ; Cleary v. Booth, [1893] 5 Q.B. 263.
This peacekeeping role is sometimes stated as a function of school authorities to
prevent the disruption of educational programs. Deskins v. Gose, supra at 489. Yet
the usual quibbling and fighting of school children, particularly when it occurs during
recess or en route to and from school, seldom does disrupt the educational process.
Rules in this area are more appropriately related to the protection of students who
must gather together in class and walk to and from school at stated times. The court
in Deskins indicated that fighting on the way home would disrupt the educational
processes because it would tend to "engender hostile feelings between scholars . . .
and [destroy] that harmony and good will which should always exist among scholars
" Id. This rationale, however, would apply to all fighting among children
who attended the same school, no matter when or where the scuffling occurred. Such
a connection with the school seems too tenuous to allow displacement of parental
authority or the authority of general governmental law enforcement bodies, and the
Deskins court itself very clearly limited its holding to fighting on the way home from
school. But see Hutton v. State, 23 Tex. Ct. App. R. 386, 5 S.W. 122 (1887) ; Cleary
v. Booth, supra at 264 (dictum).
122 102 Conn. 130, 128 A. 25 (1925) ; see Satariano v. Sleight, 54 Cal. App. 2d
278, 129 P.2d 35 (1942). But cf. Kerwin v. County of San Mateo, 176 Cal. App. 2d
304, 1 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1959); Price v. York, 24 Ill. App. 2d 450, 164 N.E.2d 617
(1960).
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near the school frequently stood outside his house and "abused" young
girls on their way home from school. After repeated complaints by
the girls' parents, the principal applied corporal punishment to the
boy. In a civil assault and battery action brought by the boys' mother,
the court upheld the principal's use of reasonable and moderate punishment. On appeal, the student argued that no school regulations could
control the conduct of a pupil once he had reached his home after
school. This argument was based on the school-home dichotomy of
the in loco parentis theory of school control. 2 4 The court rejected
this argument, on the grounds that protection of students en route from
school was not only a proper school board concern, but a positive duty
since it was only because of their school attendance that the girls found
it necessary to walk by plaintiff's house."
Thus, the court correctly saw the school's protection of the
children in its care from harm caused by others as a legitimate aspect
of the host function. Such protection is appropriately related to
education in that the students are where they are because of school
attendance. The statutory delegation of authority to school boards
to educate does not mean that educators may act as general law
enforcement agencies for youth. " As is true of all its authority, a
IM See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
124 The court stated that the offending boy's parents could not be depended on to
protect the girls from harm, as not all parents are sufficiently concerned with the
harm to others caused by their children. Nor, according to the court, could the general
law enforcement authorities be relied upon since childhood fighting and like activities
are often considered too trivial to be handled by general law enforcement. See also
People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), vacated
and remanded o other grounds, 89 S. Ct. 252 (1968), in which the court sustained a
police search of a high school students school locker for marijuana on the grounds
that the school authorities had consented to the search. The court stated that the
relationship between school authorities and the student is unique:
The school authorities have an obligation to maintain discipline over the
students. It is recognized that, when large numbers of teenagers are gathered
together in such an environment, their inexperience and lack of mature judgment can often create hazards to each other. Parents, who surrender their
children to this type of environment in order that they may continue developing both intellectually and socially, have a right to expect certain safeguards.
It is in the high school years particularly that parents are justifiably concerned that their children not become accustomed to antisocial behavior, such
as the use of illegal drugs. The susceptibility to suggestion of students of
high school age increases the danger. Thus, it is the affirmative obligation
of the school authorities to investigate any charge that a student is using or
possessing narcotics and to take appropriate steps, if the charge is substantiated.
Id. at 362-63, 229 N.E.2d at 597-98, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25.
125 But see Kitsuse & Circourel, The High School's Role in Adolescent Status
Transition,in EDUCATION IN URBAN Socnry 70, 76 (B. Chandler, L. Stiles & J. Kitsuse eds. 1962) :
As a consequence of compulsory attendance regulations, the school with which
the adolescent and, consequently, his family aro affiliated becomes one of the
first institutions to which reports of misconduct are referred. The school, for
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school board's law enforcement authority must be functionally' related
to education. 6 In addition, this law enforcement aspect of the host
function usually involves the protection of children from harm inflicted
by their schoolmates. The school has brought the group of children
together, and thus the school is responsible for preventing the harm
to some that might be caused by others. 2
A slightly different situation exists where school attendance presents a risk that the individual student may harm himself. A Michigan
school board passed a rule requiring "pupils .

. to go directly to

their homes at the close of school at noon and at-night, unless required
or specially permitted by their teachers to remain." 18 The owner
of a nearby candy store protested and brought an action to have the
rule declared invalid. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the rule
in Jones v. Cody,"2 stating:
It is not only the legal right, but the moral duty, of
school authorities, to require children to go directly from
school to their homes [and since the state requires children
to attend school] [t]he least that the State can in reason do
example, is the agency to which police, shopkeepers, civic organizations, welfare agencies, and parents report on pupil behavior.

This article is a well written critique of the too pervasive effect of modern schools on
adolescents. See also E. FRIEDENBERG, COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA (1965) ; E. FRIEDFor a discussion of the more affirmaENBERG, THE VANISHING ADOLESCENT (1959).
tive possibilities of school assistance in the problem of juvenile delinquency, see Moore,
supra note 117, at 201-262.
126 The school board has no general power to punish for misconduct not functionally related to education. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. Thus, even
the moral pollution cases, notes 103-19 supra and accompanying text, recognize that
a school cannot exclude a child as punishment for his nonschool offense, but can only
do so to protect the other children from his polluting influence. The question arises,
though, of the correct test of possible moral pollution. In the case of both married
students and unwed mothers we employed a strict test of "clear and imminent danger"
of moral pollution. This was deemed appropriate in the married student's case because
the school board was acting in opposition to the statutory schemes permitting marriage
and providing free education for all children. Even with the unwed mother's case,
our society is sufficiently ambiguous as to the enforcement of laws against premarital
sex and generally looks upon the unwed mother as in need of help so as to call for
employment of the same standard. In the case of a clear breach of societal standardse.g., where a student has been convicted of grand larceny-there is no doubt that
society wants to and does punish that offense. It would seem, therefore, that the only
interest invaded by exclusion from school of such a student is that of free public
education. Standing alone this might support only a lesser exclusionary standard
such as a reasonable likelihood of moral pollution. Although I am not certain as to
the correct result, I incline to the strict test even in the grand larceny case. Societal
treatment of a delinquent juvenile is, in theory at least, rehabilitative and not punitive.
Thus, society's official position after the offense has been committed is essentially the
same in regard to the juvenile thief as it is to the teenage unwed mother--.e., how
best to aid the individual. Depriving him of the rehabilitative tool of public education
on the "reasonable likelihood" that he may corrupt fellow students does not seem in
keeping with this position.
2 1
M Moreover, the school cannot rely upon other agencies of control to prevent
such harm, see note 124 supra.
128 Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 14, 92 N.W. 495 (1902).
129 Id.

at 13, 92 N.W. at 495.

SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY

is to throw every safeguard possible around the children who
in obedience to the law are attending school.' 80
Plaintiff in the case, it should be noted, was not the parent of a student,
but rather a nearby merchant who suffered economic injury as a
result of the school rule. This would justify the court's assumption
that the school board here was acting to further parental wishes rather
than to displace parental authority. Viewed in this light, the decision
is clearly correct. The store owner has no right to demand that the
students be permitted to go into his store. 3' The school board clearly
has the power to promulgate and enforce a rule, in accord with parental
desires, to protect students from school-connected hazards.
If, however, such a rule conflicts with parental wishes, a different
analysis is required.3 2 Displacement of parental authority in this case
cannot be viewed as a legitimate concern of the education per se
function. 3' Nor can it be seen as a valid exercise of the host function.
Primary responsibility for a child's spending and eating habits rests
with the parents. While the school is connected to the candy store by
physical proximity, the school is not responsible for its activities-the
store cannot be called a "school-created hazard." That a child must
pass a candy store on the way home from school does not give the
school board power to supplant parental authority to determine whether
or not the child frequents the store.'3
'

30

Id. at 16, 92 N.W. at 496.

131 See Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933) ; Bozeman v.
Morrow, 34 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). But see Haley v. Brooks, 191 S.W.
781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
=3It has been assumed for purposes of this discussion that the school board's
displacement of parental authority was justified to assure the well-being of this particular child, and not that of other children. It would seem that no other children are
involved if one parent allows his child to go into a candy store. Yet, the fact that one
child can go into the store may produce the popular refrain: "If Johnny can do it,
why can't I?" among the other children. Nevertheless the school board should not be
permitted to keep Johnny out of the store in order to enforce the desires of the parents
of the other children. This would go beyond the supporting role the school board
takes on when it promulgates rules with which all parents are in agreement, and
would coerce Johnny's parents in order to aid the other parents' control of their
children. While the case might be stated as analogous to those in which a child is
excluded from school because he might seriously morally pollute the other children,
I do not think the school board could coerce Johnny and his parents in this case even
if it could be shown that there was a clear and imminent danger that other children
would violate their parent's wishes and accompany Johnny into the candy store.
While there might be a clear and imminent danger of this result the harm involved
does not even approach that involved in the risk of serious physical disease or moral
pollution. The school's need to protect its students is minimal and the primary interest
involved remains the freedom of Johnny and his parents.
.33 See text accompanying notes 61-93 supra for a discussion of the scope of the
education per se function.
13 The cases that uphold school prohibitions against students leaving the school
for lunch appear to be contrary to the analysis suggested on the text In the first
case, Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 134 S.E. 360 (1926), parents sought to enjoin the
enforcement of a school regulation that "[l]eaving the campus between the hours of
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More difficult is the problem whether the school board, as the
purveyor of services, some of which create hazards for school children,
has the power to restrict access to these services in order to reduce the
risks to the most vulnerable students presented by such school-created
hazards. While it seems clear that a school board could refuse to
provide facilities for a high school football team because the board
members felt that football was too dangerous,'- it is not equally certain
that once the school provides the facility it may exclude a particular
student from active participation. Assume that the school does
maintain a football team but excludes the following students from
participation:
(a) those with low grades;
(b) those who, in the opinion of the school doctor, are not
physically well enough to participate without serious risk
of harm to themselves; and
(c) married students.
Assume further that all such students are excluded on the ground that
it is not in their own best interest to participate. The student with low
grades should not waste time playing football when he should be
9 am. and 3:35 p.m. is strictly prohibited .

.

.

."

In upholding the rule, the court

did not discuss the question of school board power to adopt the rule or any reasons
for its promulgation; instead it spoke in general terms of judicial deference to the
board's exercise of power delegated to it by the legislature, and was mainly concerned
with rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the regulation denied them a "property right!'
This opinion was relied on in Richardson v. Braham,125 Neb. 42, 249 N.W. 557 (1933),
which upheld a similar rule on a nonfunctional in loco parentis theory with some
suggestion of an education per se rationale. More recently, a Kentucky school rule
providing that "no one, while in school, shall be allowed to enter the restaurant of
Mr. Russell or any other business establishment in the town without permission from
8:15 a.m. until 3:00 p.m." was sustained. Casey County Board of Educ. v. Luster,
282 S.W2d 333 (Ky. 1955). There the court said: "Teachers and officials . . . who
in a general way stand in loco parentis to their pupils, are better qualified to judge
. . . the wisdom of such rules and regulations than are the courts. . . . The courts
will not interfere unless it appear [school officials] have acted arbitrarily or maliciously." Id. at 334. The court spoke too of the children's table conduct, apparently
employing an education per se analysis. Lastly, the court seemed to approve a purpose
of the rule to insure the school cafeteria's economic profit. This should be contrasted
with Hailey v. Brooks, 191 S.W. 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), where the court enjoined
enforcement of a rule prohibiting students to purchase food and school supplies from
plaintiff merchant. The court there rejected the school authorities' nonfunctional
in loco parentis theory of complete control over students during the school day.
Moreover, the court said the allegation of an enforced boycott, if proven, would state
an antitrust cause of action. Unfortunately, Hailey has not been followed even in
Texas. See, e.g., Bozeman v. Morrow, 34 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Bishop
v. Houston Independent School Dist., 29 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930). See
also Fitzpatrick v. Board of Educ., 54 Misc. 2d 1085, 284 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct.
1967) (upholding a rule prohibiting students from leaving the school for lunch on
grounds that the "commotion and noise [of their leaving] would interfere with those
who were left in the building to study") For an interesting picture of life in a school
cafeteria see E. FamDENazaG, COMING OF AGE ixrAmmucA 30-32 (1965).

IMKinzer v. Directors of Independent School Dist., 129 Iowa 441, 105 N.W. 686
(1906).
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studying.130 The rationale behind the exclusion of the physically unfit
student is obvious. Married students are excluded because the obligations of marriage are so demanding and time-consuming as to preclude
this diversion. 1 '
In each of these cases, the school board is asserting a right not to
allow its instrument, the football team, to be used in a way it considers
harmul to the student. In each of these cases, however, this action
intrudes on the decision-making powers of others. Is it for the school
board to budget the time of poor students and married students? Is
it for the school board to override the decision of the boy and his
parents that the benefits of playing football outweigh the risk to his
physical health?
These are hard questions, and I don't know any easy answers.
Nor have the cases provided any answers. Indeed, the questions haven't
been asked."8' There are, however, some cases that may be helpful
in analyzing these problems. There is no doubt that school authorities
can assign homework and adopt reasonable rules to compel its completion.' 39 But while recognizing the assignment of homework as a
proper function of school administrators, courts have been virtually
unanimous in striking down school board rules directed at enforced
study hours outside school or restrictions on other out-of-school
activities in order to promote study. In the leading case of Dritt v.
Snodgrass,' a majority of the court stated that a school board rule
prohibiting students from attending social parties during the school
Dritt was followed in the Mississippi case of
year was invalid.'
Hobbs v. Germany,'" which invalidated a school board rule requiring
138
This assumed rationale for scholastic eligibility requirements for interscholastic
sports is just that-an assumption. In the leading work on high school athletics,
C. FORSYTHE, ADMINISTRATION or HIGH SCHOOL ATHLEtIcS 72-74 (1954), it is pointed
out that in virtually all school areas there are scholastic eligibility requirements.
However, the author never adequately explains the basis for such requirements. It is
probable that such rules stem from the assumption stated above, a desire to increase
scholarship with the carrot of participation in athletics, and a view that an athletic
hero should not provide a bad example to others. See Cochrane v. Board of Educ.,
360 Mich. 390, 413-14, 103 N.W.2d 564, 580-81 (1960). See also C. FORSYTHE, supra,
at 61-62.
37
' See School Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) ; Cochrane v.
Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 564 (1960).
-3 8 In this regard it is of interest that the leading work on high school sports
discusses the purpose of eligibility regulations primarily in terms of the need for
uniform standards for competing teams. C. FoRsYTH, supra note 136, at 58-96. The
prevailing lack of sensitivity to the important educational policy decisions involved in
interscholastic sports is also highlighted by the very minimal role in formulation of
athletic policy that Forsythe grudgingly gives the school boards. Id. at 166-67.
39
' See Blading v. State, 23 Tex. Ct. App. R. 172, 4 S.W. 579 (1887).
14o66 Mo. 286 (1877).

141 See also State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887).
Magnum v. Keith, 147 Ga. 603, 95 S.E. 1 (1918).
142 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515 (1909).

But cf.
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all students to remain in their homes and study from 7:00 P.M. to
9:00 P.M. Despite the importance of study to the educational process,
the court refused to construe the general Mississippi school statutes as
giving the school board power to regulate a child's specific use of time
when he is out of school. This was too great a displacement of
parental authority.
It does not follow from this, however, that the school board cannot
deny the use of its football facilities to a poor student in order to
encourage him to use such time in study. The board seeks to protect
an interest-if not the interest-central to the educational processstudy. While the school prohibits the use of its facilities as a diversion
from study, it does not deny the student's use of outside facilities. Nor
does it require the student to engage in study at specific times. Thus,
exclusion of the poor student from the football field would appear to
be a valid exercise of the host function.
The only difference between the exclusion of the poor student
and the exclusion of the physically weak or married student lies in the
interest the school protects when it denies the student the right to play
football. In one case this interest is the student's health; in the other,
the success of his marriage. In neither of these cases is the interest
central to the educational structure; indeed, these interests normally
are not even proper concerns of the structure. Nevertheless, when the
school board decides whether or not to provide specific services, it is
proper for it to consider the conflict with other social interests that
may be involved. Thus, the school board may refuse to sponsor interscholastic football because it is too dangerous a game. The general
denial of interscholastic football is a decision that has general repercussions in the community and, thus, is subject to effective political
control. It is noncoercive and invades no interests other than that of
the entire community in having the school provide certain activities.
On the other hand, the denial of football to a specific individual
is not subject to such community control. When the denial is based on
the determination of the physical attributes of an individual, and an
assessment of the risks as compared with the advantages playing
football will have for that individual, the board is making a judgment
usually left to the child and his parents. Yet, the school is not a
neutral bystander. It provides football facilities and can hardly be
faulted for desiring that these facilities not be used to cause serious
harm to its students. Indeed, the community's sense of the school
board's responsibility to those students willing to risk serious injury
would no doubt condemn the board if, at the insistence of the boy
and his parents, the student was allowed on the field and was in fact

1969]

SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY

injured. Such public attitudes should be recognized as part of the
background against which school board powers are delegated. 143
In addition to the school board's responsibility to the individual
health risk, there is the need to protect the other players from harm in
terms of the guilt feelings likely to result if the sickly student is
actually injured. In light of these considerations it would seem that
the better view is to recognize the school authorities' right to keep a
student off the football field, despite the wishes of the boy and his
parents, where the school authorities reasonably conclude that there is
a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to the student if he plays.
Exclusion of married students in order to further the success of
the marriage is, like the exclusion of the physically weak student,
essentially paternalistic in nature.' 4 The purpose is the same in
both cases-the protection of an interest unrelated to the educational
structure. But determining what activities impede or facilitate a
healthy marital relationship is much more complex and difficult than
determining what activities may present a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to an individual. Our society is naturally reluctant to
commit the former decisions to public bodies, particularly when such
decisions are peripheral to their main function. In addition, the relationship between school football and the protected interest of physical
health is direct and immediate. There is no such obvious causal connection between football and the breakdown of a student's marriage.1 45
Nor need the school board be concerned with the protection of fellow
players. Therefore, the school board, acting under a typical general
statute, does not have the power to exclude a married student from
playing football on grounds that to do so would divert him from
spending the time necessary to make his marriage work.
143 Also indicative of this feeling is the almost universal acceptance of schoolboard-imposed physical requirements for interscholastic athletic competition. See,
C. FoRsYTHE, supra note 136, at 58-60, 65-72. For example, Forsythe quotes the following from Frederick Ravel Rodgers:
The single eligibility rule which scholastic athletic associations may properly
enforce is the presentation of a medical certificate of physical competence by
each player before he may engage in games scheduled by the [athletic] association. The wisdom of this requirement is so obvious that it should not have
to be classified as a rule. Any local administrators who, in the past, have
omitted this precautionary measure should immediately take steps to protect
their pupils from avoidable strains, and themselves from blame by this requirement.
Other eligibility rules ought to be abolished by interscholastic athletic

associations .

...

Id. at 58-59.
14 4 See School Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1268, 147 N.W.2d 854, 859 (1967).
145 If the combined effect of football and marriage impairs the married student's
grades he may be excluded from football on scholastic grounds, just as the nonmarried student is excluded.
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The last school board function ancillary to its primary function
of education per se is that of protecting the educational process itself
from disruption. This may be classified as part either of the education
per se or of the host function. This function often overlaps, and is
sometimes confused with, the function of protecting the students who
gather together for school purposes, yet, analytically these two should
be viewed separately.
While some earlier cases have upheld school regulations on the
ground that they prevented disruption of the educational process, 4 "
it was not until the recent spate of cases involving haircut, dress, and
other personal appearance rules that the notion of protecting instruction
from distraction and commotion became a significant basis for upholdthat invade the interests
ing coercive rules governing student 4conduct
7
makers.'
decision
of other authorized
For example, in the 1965 Massachusetts case of Leonard v. School
Committee, 4 8 the court upheld the suspension of a pupil for failure to
comply with the board's rule concerning the proper length of hair on
the grounds that:
the unusual hair style of the plaintiff could disrupt and impede
the maintenance of a proper classroom atmosphere or
decorum. This is an aspect of personal appearance and hence
akin to matters of dress. Thus as with any unusual, immodest, or exaggerated mode of dress, conspicuous departures
from accepted customs in the matter of haircuts could result
in the distraction of other students.'49
Similarly, a federal district court in Texas upheld the validity of a
school rule against long hair:
Since confusion and anarchy have no place in the classroom
school authorities must control the behavior of their students.
If the student's dress is lewd or his appearance is a studied
effort to draw attention to himself, his presence is disruptive-such behavior is no different than verbal rudeness.'r 0
146 See, e.g, Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485 (1885) ; Hutton v. State, 23 Tex. Ct.
App. R. 386, 5 S.W. 122 (1887) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) ; State ex rel.
Dresser v. Dist. Bd., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232 (1908) ; cf. Fitzpatrick v. Board of
Educ., 54 Misc. 2d 1085, 284 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
47
1
See note 88 supra.
148 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
149 Id. at 709-10, 212 N.E.2d at 472.
1-0 Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Tex.
1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968). See also
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Akin v. Riverside Unified School
Dist., 262 Cal. App. 2d 187, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Ct. App. 1968). The court's reference
to "verbal rudeness" seems to express a judgment concerning proper etiquette as well
as an explanation of disruption. This appears to indicate the court's view that the rule
against long hair may be part of an education per se function. Later in the opinion
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Contrary to these decisions, however, is the 1967 ruling of the
State Board of Education of New Jersey.' 51 That ruling involved the
expulsion from school of a fifteen-year-old student whose long hair
violated a school board regulation.'5 2 In defending the action of the
school vice-principal in expelling the student, the school board stated
that "these guidelines were laid down for the purpose of preventing
extremes in appearance and dress for the purpose of preventing
disruption to the educational process in the school system in the
judgment of the administration and the faculty .... "'5'
On appeal to the State Board of Education the local school board
produced testimony that there was some jeering and occasional
derogatory remarks when long-haired boys were called upon to recite.
The State Board also noted that there was evidence indicating a
tendency of other students to isolate themselves from the boys who
wore their hair longer than was customary.
As the State Board of Education properly recognized, "It is
essential to the orderly process of education that local boards concern
themselves with the conduct of the students in their schools where
such conduct constitutes a threat to the educational process." 1-1However, it was "not satisfied that the record demonstrates that longhaired males present a significant threat to orderly discipline in the
schools. The evidence does not indicate that the reaction of the other
students was so grave as to be beyond control by the exercise of
ordinary[,] simply disciplinary measures." ' The Board therefore
the court refers specifically to the socializing function of education.

261 F. Supp. at

551. While the overwhelming majority of commentators and courts have viewed hair

and dress restrictions as part of the board's function to prevent disruption of the
educational process, see the cases and articles cited herein and in notes 7 & 16 supra,
some educators have tried to support hair and dress rules on an education per se
rationale. See N.Y. Times, supra note 16; Brickman, fupra note 16. For a discussion
of this approach, see notes 88-93 supra, and accompanying text, But see the statement
of New York City Superintendent of Schools, Bernard E. Donovan, that "a program
of education rather than punitive action" is the proper approach to hair and dress, in
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1966, at 9, col. 5. See also Howard, supra note 7. Although
there has been no judicial approval of this rationale, some educators have also based
the validity of hair and dress regulations on the assertion that good grooming is
causally related to good school behavior. See Bliss, What's Proper for School Wear?
Weary Educators Urge Uniforms, Phila. Inquirer, May 29, 1966 (Today's World
Magazine), at 8, col. 2; Compton, Personal Appearance in Relation to High School
Girls' Scholastic Achievement and Social Behavior, 42 J. SECONDARY EDuc. 166
(1967); Handel, Can We Outlaw Fad Clothing, 77 ScHoorL EXECUTIVE 68 (1957);
Manch, Effective Ways of Regulating Student Dress, 41 BuLL. NAT'L Ass'N SEcONDARY ScHooL PRINCIPALS 144 (1957).
151 Pelletreau v. Board of Educ. (N.J. State Bd. of Educ., Sept. 6, 1967).
152 "[H]air should be trimmed neatly and be in keeping with the general style of
the time. Extremes in hair length (covering the ears, the eyebrows, and the nape of
the neck) are inappropriate in this school." Id. at 2.
3.5Id. at 2.
14 Id. at 5.
155 Id.
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concluded that the portion of the regulation involved in this proceeding
was invalid. 56
This decision is in accord with the analysis suggested here. The
State Board recognized that the local school board performs a proper
function when it acts to protect the educational process from distraction and disruption. However, it also recognized that this results
in school board control over student dress and appearance, an area
ordinarily left to private and parental decision making in our society.
Furthermore, a restriction on hair length while in school is a significant invasion of this private decision making. Finally, expulsion
or suspension of an offending student runs counter to the norm of
universal public education. Therefore, the school board action could
not be based on the suspicion of possible disruption. Rather, it could
only be based on a showing of a clear and imminent danger to the
educational process. 5
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS

Discussion thus far has focused on the limits of school board
power under a general legislative delegation of authority to promulgate
and enforce rules for the governance of the school system. I now turn
to the question who is to determine and enforce limitations on school
board power. The school board, of course, is primarily responsible for
determining the limits of its power. It is essential that school boards
be aware of the nature of their functions and of the appropriate
criteria on which they can rely to decide that the school interest overcomes that of other institutions in the society.
Yet, under our legal system, the courts are still responsible for
making the final determination. It is they who must construe and
enforce the relevant statutes. As Professor Jaffe has written, "a
major premise" of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that "the judiciary
I

6

The state board acted in this case as a reviewing court rather than as an

administrative policy maker. The opinion is based on the proposition that the school
board has the policy making power in this area and could only be overturned if it acted
beyond its legal power. For a similar decision of a state education office acting as
would a reviewing court, see In re Dalrymple, 5 N.Y. ED. D'T REP. 113, at 116-17
(1966). See also the rule of the Delaware State Board of Education, promulgated
Nov. 22, 1967, quoted in a letter from Kenneth C. Madden, Sec'y and State Superintendent of Schools to Gilbert N. Cantor, Esq., Nov. 27, 1967, on file in Biddle Law
Library. For a recent court decision reaching a result similar to that of the New
Jersey State Board of Education, see Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., Civ.
No. 45522 (Calif. Super. Ct, Humboldt County, Nov. 1966).
157 This article is not concerned with the constitutional arguments that have been
raised against hair and dress regulations. See Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School
Dist, 89 S. Ct. 98 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) ; Comment, The
Right to Dress and Go to School, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv. 492 (1965); Comment, 17

J. PUB. L. 151 (1968).
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is the ultimate guarantor of legality." '51

"There is in our society a

profound, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as the ultimate
guardian and assurance of the limits set upon executive power by
the constitutions and legislatures." '69
Unfortunately, courts frequently do not function in this way.
Rules suspending married students from school or excluding them
from extracurricular activities have been upheld as not "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable." 160 This test, at best, assumes that the
school board has the power to adopt rules restricting the access of
married students to educational facilities. Yet the assumption is the
crucial issue that must be faced, for in the absence of a specific statutory
delegation of authority to regulate the status of married students, these
rules, to be valid, must perform a proper educational function. Further,
these regulations are valid only if the requirements of the educational
function are determined to take precedence over the other social interests involved.
As an exercise in proper judicial review of school board action,
let us take the situation presented in the 1967 Iowa case of Board of
Directors v. Green.'
The court there was called upon to determine
the validity of a school regulation excluding married students from
participation in extracurricular activities. Plaintiff Green had been
a regular player on the school basketball team, but, pursuant to this
3.S

L. JArE .supra note 60, at 154.

19 Id. at 321. For a full discussion of this issue, see id. at 152-96, 232-60, 32094, 546-653. It is true, of course, that the court's role as guardian of legality does
not mean that all issues defined as "legal" must be decided by the court independent of
the prior administrative determination. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,
Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
See getnerally JAYF, mepra note 60, at 546-94. Hearst and O'Leary, however, both involved the application of a broad legal standard to a specific, and relatively narrow,
factual situation. Where the issue is one of more general statutory construction in order
to ascertain the broad statutory limits in which administrative discretion can operate,
courts do, and should, make independent legal determinations. See, e.g., Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1941). This is the situation regarding
(1) the determination that the general enabling statute delegates coercive rulemaking
power to school boards only with respect to matters in which the primary interest is
a proper function of the educational structure; (2) the determination of the proper
functions of the educational structure; and (3) the determination of the general
criteria by which the finding is made that in the specific case, the educational function
is paramount to the other social interest involved, e.g., that married students can only
be excluded from school if the failure to exclude them would present a clear and
imminent threat of harm to the moral health of the other students or to the functioning
of the educational process.
160 See, e.g., Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1267, 147 N.W.2d 854,
858 (1967) (a "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable" test) ; State ex Tel. Thompson v.
Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 34, 302 S.W.2d 57, 59 (1957) ; cf. Fitzpatrick v. Board of Educ., 54 Misc. 2d 1085, 284 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1967);
Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 709, 212 N.E.2d 468, 472 (1965) ("Here,
accordingly, we need only perceive some rational basis for the rule requiring acceptable
haircuts to sustain its validity. Conversely, only if convinced that the regulation of
pupils' hair styles and length could have no reasonable connection with the successful
operation of a public school could we hold otherwise.")
161 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967).
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rule, was excluded from playing during his senior year because of his
marriage the previous summer. He brought a bill in equity to enjoin
the school board from enforcing the rule. Apparently, there had been
no school board hearing on adoption of the rule or on its application
to plaintiff Green. However, in the course of his suit for injunctive
relief the board gave the following reasons for adoption of the rule:
1. Married students assume new and serious responsibilities.
Participation in extracurricular activities tends to interfere
with discharging these responsibilities.
2. A basic education program is even more essential for married students. Therefore, full attention should be given to
the school program in order that such student may achieve
success.
3. Teenage marriages are on the increase. Marriage prior
to the age set by law should be discouraged. Excluding
married students from extracurricular activities may tend to
discourage early marriages.
4. Married students need to spend time with their families in
order that the marriage will have a better chance of being
successful.
5. Married students are more likely to drop out of school.
Hence, marriage should be discouraged among teenage
students.
6. Married students are more likely to have undesirable influences on other students during the informal extracurricular
activities.
7. The personal relationships of married students are different from those of non-married students. Non-married
students can be unduly influenced as a result of relationships
with married students.
8. Married students may create school moral and disciplinary
problems, particularly in the informal extracurricular activities where supervision is more difficult.1 6
Using the functional analysis proposed, a court would reject the
coercive education per se or anti-emulation rationales of reason number
Seven of these reasons fall into the fol162 Id. at 1268, 147 N.W.2d at 858-59.
lowing categories:
A. Number 3 consists of (1) discouraging teenage marriage as a coercive education per se device, or (2) excluding married students to prevent emulation by other
students.
B. Numbers 1, 2 and 4 deny participation in extracurricular activities to prevent
diversion of the married student's time from more important matters.
C. Number 6 and 7 see the married student as posing a threat to the moral health
of those students forced to associate with him.
D. Number 8 is based on both a concern for the protection of the students from
moral pollution and the protection of the educational structure from interference and
disruption.
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three.' 6 Reason number five, however, presents an interesting variant.
It is based on the school board's desire to discourage teenage marriage
because of its detrimental effect on the students concerned, and is thus
similar to the straight coercive education per se or emulation rationale
of number three. However, the detrimental effect of teenage marriage
on the student is limited here to the alleged high dropout rate of
married students. This is related to the educational structure. The
earlier analysis in this paper had concluded that school authorities can
deny a student the right to participate in extracurricular activities
because he has low grades. The rationale for this was that the school
could act so as not to divert the poor student's attention from scholarship. Such action was deemed central to the educational function.
Is reason number five analogous to that situation? In my view the
answer is no. It is true that the aim of the rule is the same as the one
denying a poor student the right to engage in sports-that is, the
aim is to aid the student's scholarship. The difference, however, is in
the means. Reason number five consists of a coercive school rule
aimed at deterring student marriages in order to promote scholarship.
As such it seriously invades the statutory scheme of private decisionmaking and is therefore much more closely analogous to rules that
attempt to set specific home study periods or preclude home social
activities as a means of encouraging study, than it is to one that
denies a student the right to play football in order to help his scholarship. The former rules have long ago been rejected as beyond the
power of a school board under a general enabling statute.'
For the reasons also discussed earlier in this paper, exclusion
based on reasons number one, two, and four are beyond the power
of a school. A court employing the functional analysis, however,
would conclude that reasons six, seven, and eight are legitimate aspects
of the host function, relating to the moral health of the students who
gather in the schools and to the efficient and smooth operation of the
educational structure.
Some courts, having determined that the school board was purporting to base its rule on a proper school board concern, have concluded that their review function is terminated or, at best, is limited
to the "reasonableness" or "nonarbitrariness" of the rule. 65 But the
16 3

See notes 69-75, 118 supra and accompanying text; note 162 supra.

164 See notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text.

165 For cases where the court has concluded that their review function is terminated at that point, see, e.g., Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass.

(8 Cush.) 160 (1850)

(immoral conduct); Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441, 86

P. 642 (1906) (Greek letter societies). For cases where the court has limited its
review to a determination of the "reasonableness" of the rule, see, e.g., Board of
Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) ; Leonard v. School Comm.,

349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); Fitzpatrick v. Board of Educ., 54 Misc. 2d
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analysis suggested here requires further judicial inquiry. The fact
that the school board is acting out of a proper interest is a necessary
but not a conclusive element in determining the validity of a rule. General enabling acts should not be construed to allow school board regulation of all matters properly of concern to them regardless of any
conflict with other social interests. Rather, the general enabling acts
should be construed to allow school board regulation to predominate
over other social concerns if, and only if, the school board interest is
the paramount one involved.
The courts are the allocators of societal power under the totality
of the legal scheme as they construe it. As Professor Jaffe has so
well stated:
The constitutional courts are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the legal system. I
use integrity here in its specific sense of unity and coherence
and in its more general sense of the effectuation of the values
upon which this unity and coherence are built. In a society
so complex, so pragmatic as ours, unity is never realized, nor
is it necessary that it should be. Indeed there is no possibility of agreement on criteria for absolute unity; what is
contradiction to one man is higher synthesis to another. But
within a determined context there may be a sense of contradiction sufficient to create social distress; and it is one of
the grand roles of our constitutional courts to detect such
contradictions and to affirm the capacity of our society to
integrate its purposes. The statute under which an agency
operates is not the whole law applicable to its operation. An
agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the many
rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended
to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought
into harmony with the totality of the law, the law as it is
found in the statute at hand, the statute book at large, the
principles and conceptions of the common law, and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.'6 8
The courts, therefore, in fulfilling this role must set general criteria
to determine when the school interest is paramount. The suggested
criteria would support a determination that reasons six and seven
support the conclusion of the primacy of the school interest only if
the determination is also made that the participation of married
students in extracurricular activities presents a reasonable likelihood
1085, 284 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ; State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio
Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (1961); State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of
Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957).
166 JA1F, supra note 60, at 327. See also id. at 589-92.
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of serious harm to the moral health of other students or to the efficient
operation of school activities.' 67
This, then, poses the hard question: Who is to determine the
existence or nonexistence of such a reasonable likelihood of harm-the
school board or the court? Although school boards usually do adopt
rules in meetings formally open to the public, the cases indicate that
the factual and inferential bases of the rules are not usually propounded
or recorded at such meetings. Nor are such reasons given when
action is taken against an individual student for failure to comply with
a particular rule. Thus, at the time legal action is brought to challenge
the rule, there is usually no alternative to a full judicial hearing on
the factual and inferential bases of the rule.0 s
The need for a judicial hearing, however, does not mean that the
court should disregard prior school board determinations. The fact
that there is no record does not necessarily mean there was no factual
information used by the board in making its determination. There
are two primary sources of information available to a school board
that do not require the taking of testimony. The first is the professional
staff of the educational structure. This staff usually includes psychologists and trained guidance counselors as well as teachers, principals
and members of the administrative hierarchy. The second is the board
members themselves, drawn from the local community, and-at least
if they are an elected body-responsive to that community. The factual
determination that a married student's presence threatens other
students' moral health, or the functioning of the educational structure,
is closely related to both educational expertise and community mores.
107 If the issue were total exclusion of married students from school it would be
framed in terms of a clear and imminent threat of serious harm to the moral health of
the other students or to the efficient operation of the school.
15 The majority of cases concerning coercive school board rules arise through the
nonstatutory review methods of mandamus, see, e.g., Mathews v. Board of Educ., 127
Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (1901) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of
Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957), or injunction, see, e.g., Leonard v. School
Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo.
466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922). Where corporal punishment is the sanction for violation of
the rule the method of review is usually a damage action for assault and battery, see,
e.g., O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 128 A. 25 (1925) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114 (1859) ; cf. State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266 (1888) (criminal assault
and battery prosecution) ; Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942)
(assault and battery action for compensation for medical treatment). In the few cases
that have raised the issue, the courts have rejected damage actions as a remedy for a
wrongful exclusion from school, see Douglass v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211
(1909) ; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877) ; cf. Learock v. Putnam, 11 Mass. 499
1873). But cf. Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965);
MA.ss. GEm LAws ch. 76, § 16 (1953). For an extremely unusual and attenuated
situation in which a court passed on the validity of a school rule, see Bolding v. State,
23 Tex. Crin. App. 172, 4 S.W. 579 (Ct. App. 1887). See also State v. Gans, 168
Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958). For general discussion of these methods of
review of administrative action, see JA='E, supra note 60, at 152-260.
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In passing on the facts adduced at the judicial hearing the court
should, therefore, take into account the prior determination of the
school board based on the institutional information available to it.

69

What weight the board determination should bear is another problem.
In other contexts, authorities have spoken of a "presumption of correctness" of administrative action." 0 Another formula might look to
whether, on the facts adduced at the judicial hearing, the school board
could reasonably have found the requisite "reasonable likelihood of
harm."
The difficulty with any one of these tests lies in the wide range of
This discussion began on
the school board decision-making process."
the assumption that the school board used the proper legal criteria in
arriving at its decision. This assumption would seem contrary to fact
in most cases today. Where the school board does not act on its view
that a reasonable likelihood of harm exists, no deference should be
given to its nonexistent prior determination of this question. 7 2 Even
where it appears that the school board might have addressed itself to
the proper issue, uncertainty whether it did or not should diminish the
judicial deference due to its possible determination. Finally, even
where it is certain that the issue was determined by the board, the
importance and validity of the assumption as to the expertise of the
school administration and the representativeness of the school board
members may differ from school system to school system and from
issue to issue even within the same system. 3 The best test would
seem to be one providing that, in the absence of a factual hearing at the
school board level, a court must find that, on the record taken as a
whole, there is the requisite reasonable likelihood of harm. The record
taken as a whole should include the fact that the school board did make
a prior determination on this point. The significance of this prior
determination must depend on the circumstances of each case.' 4
169 See generally People v. Walsh, 244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E. 575 (1927); JA=F,

mtpra note 60, at 186-92, 622-23; Comment, 70 H v. L. Rv. 698 (1957).
170 See Comment, 70 HARv. L. RFv. 698, 703 (1957).
' Compare the discussion in NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d
Cir. 1950), vacated and remanded, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), rev'd, 190 F.2d 429 (2d
Cir. 1951).
172 Deference is due only to a finding actually made. School board expertise is
irrelevant where it has not been exercised. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943). Moreover, if the court upholds a rule solely because the school board could
have made the finding when the school board has not made the finding, it is upholding
the rule when the requisite finding has never been made by any finder-court or
school board.
17 3 See Board of Educ. v. Clendenning, 431 P.2d 382 (Okla. 1967) ; cf. Joynt v.
King, 6 App. Div. 2d 234, 176 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1958).
174 Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY

Where there has been a school board fact finding hearing, either
at the rule-making or adjudicatory stage '1, there is no need for a
judicial hearing de novo. The court can act on the basis of the record
made at the school board hearing. Judicial review should then be
limited to a determination whether, on the basis of this record as a
whole, there is substantial evidence to support the school board's finding
of a reasonable likelihood of harm." 6 This is still quite different from
upholding a school board rule on the ground that, in some abstract
way, it was reasonable (or indeed, not unreasonable) for the school
board to adopt the rule in question. The test advocated here requires
the court to define and focus upon the precise issue the school board
must determine-here, the reasonable likelihood of serious harm. Only
if the school board's determination of that issue is found to have been
reasonable is the school regulation upheld as a valid exercise of school
board power.
175 The school boards are generally given power to make "rules and regulations,"
see, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15-3614 (1959), and virtually all cases with which this
power is concerned involve sanctions imposed for violations of preexisting school
rules. There are, however, a few cases in which there was no preexisting rule and the
student contended that his discipline was, therefore, invalid; see Murphy v. Board of
Directors, 30 Iowa 429 (1870) ; Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d
468 (1965) ; State ex rel. Dresser v. District Bd., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232 (1908);
cf. State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (C.P. 1962);
Frantz v. Board of School Directors, 41 D & C 2d 211 (Pa. C.P. 1964). See generally California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366 (1965); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulenmaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921 (1965).
176The statement that school board power rests on the fact of the existence of a
reasonable likelihood of harm to the appropriate concerns of the educational structure
immediately conjures up visions of the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine of Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). As a rigid, logical doctrine of judicial review, the
jurisdictional fact doctrine has been properly discredited, see 4 K. DAVIS, supra note
60, at § 29.09; JAFFE, supra note 60, at 640-48; Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial
Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact,"
80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932). Yet, as Professor Jaffe has demonstrated, the jurisdictional fact doctrine remains viable when viewed as a functional device to isolate
those cases in which the statutory or constitutional scheme involved contemplates a
greater than usual degree of judicial control of administrative fact finding. JAFFE,
supra note 60, at 624-53.
When Professor Jaffe's functional jurisdictional fact analysis is applied to the
statutory scheme involving school board promulgation of coercive rules against married
students based on a finding that the presence of married students creates a reasonable
likelihood of causing serious harm to the moral health of the other students or to the
proper functioning of the educational process, we find that this fact is necessary to the
exercise of school board power, and that it demarcates the school board's interest and
the competing legislative interests involved in the student's freedom to marry, subject
only to parental approval, as well as his right to full enjoyment of public educational
opportunities. It might also be argued that the natural inclination of school administrators, as of other administrators who are given a specific task, is to emphasize the
efficient operation of the educational structure at the expense of these other legislative
interests. There is also the fact that exclusion of married students from extracurricular
activities involves interests of personal liberty of which courts have traditionally been
protective. Cf. St Joseph's Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 78-79
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
On the other side of this balance, however, is the fact that the determination of
harm to children or to the educational structure is not the type of determination that
courts feel competent to make. It involves a whole complex of psychological, socio-
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CONCLUSION

We have travelled a long path in discussing the validity of school
board rules. Ultimately, of course, the issue is one of statutory construction. Where the delegation of authority to the board is through
a broad enabling statute, a school board's power must be limited to
that required by its function of administering public education. Within
this power are a number of legitimate school board functions, and all
valid exercises of school board power must be an expression of an
appropriate school board function. Even if an appropriate function is
being served, however, board action may still invade areas of decision
making delegated to other groups. In order for the school board to
prevail, it must be determined that in a particular situation effectuation
of the school board function is paramount.
Under our system, the ultimate responsibility for determining the
validity of school board rules rests with the judiciary. As a result,
courts are called upon to make difficult determinations that necessarily
merge into areas of educational policy, judgments they are naturally
reluctant to make. Yet, absent more definite legislative standards in
1 77
educational enabling acts, this is a task they must continue to perform.
logical and educational factors that need expertise for their resolution. The staff of
the educational structure provides this expertise, and the school board relies on this
staff in reaching its decision.
Second, the need for the generalist to counterbalance the natural inclination of the

educational staff to maximize educational efficiency at the possible cost of other social
interests is met in substantial part by the composition of the lay school board itself.
The school board traditionally has not been, and should not be, composed of educational experts. Rather it is a group of laymen, usually elected, who bring the viewpoint of the generalist to the staff information and opinions presented to it Its decisions, therefore, are responsive to and reflect societal values other than those of the

educational structure per se.
On balance, therefore, I would conclude that where the school board has held a
factual hearing, the court should not itself have to make the finding that there is a
reasonable likelihood of serious harm in order to support the school board decision.
It is sufficient for the court to say that the school board reasonably concluded that this
exists.
177 Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967); JAFFE, irpra
note 60, at 320-27.

